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THE RULE OF CAPTURE AND THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 
OF NATURAL RESOURCE USE AND SURVIVAL UNDER 
OPEN ACCESS MANAGEMENT REGIMES 
BY 
JASON SCOTT JOHNSTON* 
 
This article recalls and explores the dynamic economic analysis of 
natural resource harvest under rule of capture, open access 
management regimes. It argues that a similar bioeconomic dynamic 
applies not only to natural resource harvest, but also to environmental 
pollution and even to private land development. Contrary to popular 
belief, the open access, rule of capture dynamic does not generally 
imply resource catastrophes such as species extinction, maximal 
pollution, or the loss of all open space. Rather, under many plausible 
conditions, market actors themselves internalize some of the costs of 
resource overuse, and there are cycles in resource abundance and use 
intensity. Wise public policies encourage economic mobility out of 
resource development/harvest even as they force resource users to 
internalize the costs of overuse. As a matter of political-economic 
reality, however, legislation often subsidizes resource overuse and 
overdevelopment. Reconsideration of the formal economic dynamics of 
the rule of capture, therefore, reminds us that it is not so much the 
economic incentives created by the rule of capture, but rather state-
subsidized resource overuse, that is responsible for the most serious 
instances of natural resource collapse and overdevelopment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The “Rule of Capture” may mean many different things. It might be 
thought of narrowly, as a common law doctrine that determines when and if 
a person acquires rights to a previously unowned, wild animal by capturing 
or killing it. Or the rule of capture may be understood a bit more broadly, as 
stating that a person has a right to however much of a commonly owned, 
public natural resource she has been able to take and reduce to her 
exclusive possession. Still more broadly, the rule of capture may be 
understood as setting up a right to unlimited use of publicly owned natural 
resources—whether the use is harvesting part of a resource stock, as with 
fish, or polluting it, as with rivers and airsheds. Finally, and most broadly, 
the rule of capture may be taken to be equivalent to a general rule of 
possession for publicly owned natural resources—the first user is the owner, 
either of what she has used or taken, or of the entire resource stock. 
In this article, I explore the economic incentives for resource use 
created by the rule of capture understood as a general, unregulated right to 
use publicly owned natural resources to whatever level one pleases, and to 
keep the flow value of that use. I state the rule of capture in this broad sense 
because this is the way it has traditionally been understood for natural 
resource harvest activities ranging from fisheries to oil and groundwater 
pumping. While it is costly to harvest such publicly owned natural 
resources—by sinking a well, or buying and operating a fishing vessel—the 
basic management regime in these core cases is open access. Hence in my 
terms, the rule of capture is a general management regime under which 
publicly owned natural resources are free and open for public use, with 
users not required to pay anything for such use. 
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My first objective in this paper is to review some of the basic economics 
of rule of capture management regimes. I do this by comparing what has 
been called the rule of first possession—essentially the rule of capture as 
applied to asset stocks1—to the rule of capture where, to repeat, the first 
possessor gets whatever she has possessed. In both situations, the rule of 
capture has certain static inefficiencies: by encouraging too rapid resource 
use and costly racing in the case of first possession, and by allowing people 
to neglect the effect of their own use in lowering the value of use by others 
in the case of the rule of capture. 
While I review these basic static inefficiencies, my main concern here is 
with the kind of dynamic incentives created by the rule of capture. I am 
interested in particular in what I take to be a widely held folk belief, which is 
that it is the open access, rule of capture management regime that is 
responsible for natural resource collapse—the loss of entire species, 
populations, or ecosystems. By reviewing some of the basic bioeconomics of 
the fishery, I explain why this belief is generally false. While it is possible for 
open access harvest to lead to extinction and resource collapse—as 
populations are hunted down to such low levels that they are no longer 
viable, and actually continue to crash to zero rather than growing back—the 
more likely bioeconomic dynamic is one of cycles in the populations of 
human harvesters and their natural prey. In such cycles, high harvest levels 
attract more harvesters, but more harvesters eventually lower the stock, 
meaning reduced profits, which cause harvesters to exit from a particular 
harvest industry, reducing harvest pressure and allowing the stock to 
recover, and so on indefinitely. 
This analysis has concrete implications for natural resource harvest 
policies. But the recommended policies—such as those that encourage 
harvesters to avoid sunk costs in harvesting particular species and systems, 
and that develop economic alternatives to harvest—have been almost the 
opposite of those that governments have actually adopted. Indeed, I argue 
that the major reason for the collapse and imperilment of species and 
ecosystems is not the bioeconomic dynamic set up by the open access rule 
of capture, but rather government policies that have systematically 
subsidized natural resource use and thereby discouraged exit from 
extractive (harvesting) industries. 
The bioeconomics of open access harvest are conventionally linked to, 
and indeed arose from, the study of resources such as fisheries and forests. 
Upon closer analysis, however, one can see that the open access, rule of 
capture management regime sets up a very similar economic dynamic both 
for natural resource pollution and land development. I present such an 
analysis here. In the case of pollution, just as the profitability of natural 
resource harvesters depends upon the size and health of the stock they are 
harvesting, so too is the productivity of most industries that pollute 
watersheds and airsheds decreased by high levels of ambient pollution. 
Moreover, just as resource stocks have natural growth rates, so too do local 
 
 1 A terminological distinction that I borrow from Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession 
and the Design of the Law, 38 J. L. & ECON. 393, 395–403 (1995). 
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environments have natural rates at which they both produce and consume 
most common pollutants. Thus a parallel to the model of resource harvest 
exists for resource pollution. I develop this model, and then explain its most 
important policy implication, which is that just as economically motivated 
human decisions regarding entry to and exit from harvest industries are key, 
so too is the regulation of polluters’ decisions about when to leave a polluted 
local environment a central concern of modern environmental laws. 
I conclude by stretching the open access model to land development. 
Land is generally privately owned, and one might think that an open access 
model therefore cannot shed light on the land development process. While 
land is privately owned, however, the location of a parcel of land strongly 
affects its value. In particular, land values in the rapidly developing, 
allegedly sprawling American urban-rural fringe are strongly affected by the 
amount of nearby undeveloped, open space land. In a very real sense, land 
development in such places is an attempt to capture the value of open space. 
It is thus subject to very similar economic dynamics as are natural resource 
harvest and pollution. I explain these dynamics and argue that they have the 
important but generally unrecognized implication that policies which 
attempt to restrict or cap land development when open space becomes 
scarce may actually cause a more rapid loss of open space. 
 
II. THE RULE OF CAPTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCE HARVEST 
 
A. Rule of Capture for Natural Resources (Asset Stocks) 
 
As applied to determine ownership of an entire asset stock—such as a 
mineral deposit—the rule of capture amounts to a system in which the first 
person to find and develop the natural resource acquires ownership of it. 
Although it has some efficient properties, such a race to develop is on 
balance likely to be inefficient. 
From an efficiency point of view, the advantage of awarding property 
rights to the first person to develop a natural resource is it incentivizes 
development effort, and—at least on average—awards the property right in 
the resource to the person with the lowest cost or highest productivity in 
searching for and developing natural resources. Development races also, 
however, generate clear inefficiencies. 
The first is that there is an externality when many persons are 
competing for a single prize. In competing for a prize, each player’s 
probability of winning—by being the first to develop—depends upon the 
intensity of effort chosen by the other contestants. The externality arises 
because no individual takes account of the negative effect of her own effort 
on the probability that other contestants will be first. Because of this failure 
to individually internalize the collective cost of capture effort, from a social 
point of view, too much effort is expended and development occurs too 
quickly.2 Indeed, with free entry into the race to develop, people enter the 
 
 2 See Dale T. Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related 
Games, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 968 (1982). As Mortensen shows, it is possible to overcome this 
externality by requiring that the capturer compensate the others for their lost net value of play 
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race provided that they expect a positive return from entry, ignoring the 
effect of their entry on the chances of others. 
This phenomenon—of rent dissipation and excessive entry—is true in a 
wide variety of contexts in which individuals race for property rights.3 In the 
natural resource area, whether this problem arises depends very much upon 
how abundant resources are relative to the number of people racing to 
acquire rights. With a large number of resources, relative to contestants for 
property rights, externalities and rent dissipation are unlikely to be a severe 
problem. When the number of contestants becomes large, relative to 
resource abundance, however, the rule of capture raises not only the 
problem of rent dissipation—too much effort invested in capture activities—
but also the problem of premature resource development. This result hinges 
upon a number of key assumptions, as can be seen when we review the 
argument in one of its clearest and earliest statements.4 
From an economic point of view, the value of a resource is determined 
by the discounted present value of the flow of profits from its development. 
Thus, until farmland is actually put into production, or a mineral deposit 
mined, it generates no positive return. Suppose now that while there is an 
annual cost of operating a farm or mine, there is one-time sunk cost of 
developing the resource for production (building the mine, clearing and 
draining the farmland). Call this the “set-up cost.” Suppose also that, for 
unspecified extraneous reasons, it will be some years before the resource 
will generate positive profits. Consider now the decision of a private owner 
of the resource, who has acquired ownership simply by acquiring formal 
title. Such an owner will obviously not incur the sunk set-up costs until she 
is actually ready to conduct operations (mining, farming). She will, 
moreover, not commence operations until the annual operating profits are 
large enough to cover interest charges on the set-up cost plus any 
appreciation or depreciation in the set-up costs over time. 
Now suppose that the only way of acquiring title to the resource stock 
(land, or a mineral deposit) is by actually incurring the set-up costs and 
beginning production. Assuming free entry—perfect competition—would-be 
owners will be pushed by competition to incur set-up costs and begin 
operations as soon as the present value of future profits is sufficient to cover 
set-up costs. When the annual profit is increasing over time, and is at first 
 
given discovery. Net values of play depend upon private information, however, particularly 
regarding individual costs of capture. These values can be elicited with something like a second 
price auction, implemented by fixing the number of entrants in the race, with the top entrants 
winning in return for an entry fee equal to the highest losing bid. Through such a mechanism, 
people will, in equilibrium, bid their true value of participation as an entry fee. This needs to be 
done sequentially at each stage of the race, and the auction stops only if the bids are at a steady 
state. 
 3 For a general demonstration of this result, see Leuck, supra note 1, at 398–402. 
 4 Clive Southey, The Staples Thesis, Common Property and Homesteading, 11 CAN. J. ECON. 
547, 553–557 (1978). Southey’s model is applied to explain and critique homesteading 
development in Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 J. L. & ECON. 
177 (1990), and to the general problem of first possession rules for asset stock ownership by 
Lueck, supra note 1, at 395–403. The earliest statement of the basic idea of which I am aware is 
Yoram Barzel, The Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 (1968). 
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negative, this zero profit condition will generally be met at a point in time 
which occurs before annual profits have become positive—before it is 
economically efficient to put the resource into production.5 
 
B. Rule of Capture for Asset Flows 
 
As is well known, managing natural resources on an open access, 
“catch what you can” basis—under the rule of capture—leads to overharvest 
of the resource. More precisely, in a classic open access problem, an 
individual harvester’s productivity depends positively on his own effort 
level, but decreases with the increased effort level of other harvesters. In 
such a model, both the past and present harvest levels of other users 
generate an externality in the form of decreased present productivity: past 
harvest causes a fall in the resource stock that makes future harvest efforts 
less productive; present harvest causes the congestion effect of increased 
present day pressure on the resource.6 
When each user is small relative to the total number of users, they all 
ignore the marginal effect of their increased harvest on other users and 
increase harvest levels until average product equals average cost. With 
declining average product, this means that—just as in the case of racing to 
capture a stock—harvest levels are too high from a social point of view.7 
This result is often taken to imply that the rule of capture (open access) will 
lead to the overexploitation and eventual extinction of non-renewable 
natural resources.8 
This perception—that open access harvest leads to resource 
extinction—is neither theoretically nor empirically sound. As a theoretical 
matter, although open access harvest is generally above what is 
economically optimal from a system-wide point of view, it will not generally 
drive a renewable resource such as wildlife or fish to extinction. The rate of 
decline of an open access resource is determined by the total effort devoted 
to harvest (number of harvesters in a world of identical harvesters) relative 
 
 5 Matters are in one sense less bad, and in another worse, when an individual gets 
ownership merely by incurring set-up costs. Individuals will wait to begin operations until they 
are profitable, and will incur set-up costs when the discounted value of profits are sufficient to 
cover set-up costs. Because negative profits are avoided, set-up costs are incurred earlier. Thus, 
such a property rights regime induces the earliest expenditure of set-up costs but a delay in 
actual operations until the optimal point in time. 
 6 For a formal model with both of these effects that solves for the steady state level of 
harvest and long run level of the resource, see Robin Brooks, Michael Murray, Stephen Salant & 
Jill C. Weise, When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access 
Correct? A Game-Theoretic Justification for Non-Game-Theoretic Analyses, 107 J. POL. ECON. 
843, 845 (1999). One-period models capture only the effect of past harvest on the present stock. 
For such a model, see Lueck, supra note 1, at 398. 
 7 For a demonstration of this basic result, see Lueck, supra note 1 at, 404–405. See also 
David A. Starrett, Property Rights, Public Goods and the Environment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 98, 102 (Karl G. Maler & J. R. Vincent eds., 2003) (using the example 
of a rancher choosing the number of cows to graze on his land). 
 8 This result traces back to H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property 
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954) (arguing that fisheries are over exploited 
because of their common property nature). 
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to the natural growth rate of the resource. More precisely, the change in any 
resource stock is equal to the natural growth in that stock, minus the 
harvest.9 Under open access, the equilibrium level of harvest (number of 
harvesters) is determined by the zero profit, rent dissipation condition. 
People enter the market to harvest an open access resource until expected 
profits decrease to zero. It is possible for this open access market dynamic 
to drive the resource stock to extinction, but only under certain biological 
and economic conditions. To understand these, it is necessary to describe 
somewhat more formally the dynamics of open access harvest. 
 
C. Open Access and Extinction 
 
1. The Dynamics of Open Access Harvest 
 
These conditions are important to understand and worthy of careful 
consideration. First, the impact of the rule of capture on the rate of resource 
depletion depends upon two separate systems: one biological and one 
economic. In its simplest form, on the biological side, the basic dynamic says 
that the per period, or instantaneous, change in the resource stock is equal 
to its natural growth (or decay) minus the harvest. Symbolically, we have 
that : 
(1) yxfdtdxx −== )(/& , 
where x is the level of the resource stock, f(x) is the natural growth and y is 
the amount harvested, and dx/dt is the (instantaneous) change in the level of 
the stock. In bioeconomic equilibrium, the size of the resource stock is not 
changing, so that f(x), the natural growth, equals the harvest, y. 
Under open access, the condition for economic equilibrium is that the 
aggregate effort level devoted to harvest is such that total industry profits 
are zero. If we think of the aggregate effort level as representing the sum of 
the individual efforts of identical harvesters, then this condition means 
economic equilibrium results when the number of harvesters increases until 
economic rents (above normal profits) have been fully dissipated. In general, 
the level of harvest, y, is determined both by the aggregate effort level, e, and 
by the level of the stock, x. That is, y = h(e,x). It is reasonable to think that in 
its most general form, ∂h/∂e > 0, ∂h/∂x > 0, with ∂2h/∂e2 < 0, meaning that 
aggregate harvest increases as effort and the stock increase, but (at least in 
the case of effort) at a declining rate (reflecting diminishing marginal 
productivity of effort). If we now let the price of the harvested good be given 
by p and the cost of effort by c, then market equilibrium requires that total 
revenues equal total costs, or: 
(2) cexeph =),(  
A sustained bioeconomic equilibrium for a resource subject to open 
access harvest is then defined by a level of the resource stock, xo, and level 
 
 9 For these basics, see COLIN W. CLARK, MATHEMATICAL BIOECONOMICS 9–12 (2d ed. 1990) 
(describing basic functions used to evaluate stock changes). 
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of effort, eo, such that both equations (1) and (2) are satisfied at (eo,xo). At 
such a sustained bioeconomic equilibrium, both the economic system 
determining harvest and the biological system being harvested are at 
unchanging levels, with a constant level of harvest effort, harvest, and 
resource stock. 
Within such a system, the question of whether or not open access 
management leads to extinction becomes the question of whether the 
equilibrium level of the resource stock xo is greater than zero. In order to 
answer this question, we need to better understand how the equilibrium 
levels of economic effort and biological resource stock are determined, that 
is, the dynamic process by which equilibrium arises. The clearest way to see 
the underlying forces behind bioeconomic equilibrium is to begin with the 
competitive (or open access) market equilibrium that determines effort.10 
The condition for open access equilibrium given by equation (2) may be 
rewritten as h(e,x) = (c/p)e, an equality that is captured graphically by 
Figure 1. The story told by Figure 1 is a very fundamental one: open access 
equilibrium results when the per unit cost of effort equals its per unit return 
(price). Hence the higher the price of the harvested resource and the lower 
the cost of harvest effort, the higher the open access, equilibrium level of 
harvest effort. Similarly, the larger the resource stock, the more productive 
the effort and the higher the open access equilibrium level of effort. 
 
Figure 1 
Equilibrium Harvest Effort under Open Access/Rule of Capture 
 
 10 This is not the standard expositional pathway found, for instance, in CLARK supra note 9, 
at 24–35; see also JON M. CONRAD & COLIN W. CLARK, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS: NOTES AND 
PROBLEMS 88–90 (1989) (discussing an early model of the common-property fishery). However, 
as can be seen from equation (2) above, the standard expositional approach tends to create 
confusion by employing a specific functional form Y = qex, for q > 0, that obscures the direct 
role of the market—which is to determine effort—with its indirect effect in determining the 
equilibrium, sustained population level. 
eeo 
h(e,x)
(c/p)e 
Stock 
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 The Figure 1 story is only the first chapter, for the combined 
biological/economic system is not in equilibrium unless the stock level, x, is 
such that the harvest h(eo,x) is such that population is static. For this to be 
true, it must be that the level of the stock is at a point at which the h(x,eo) 
and f(x) curves intersect in Figure 2. This stock level is the sustained, or 
steady state level xo—a level such that, given the harvest effort level 
determined by economic incentives, natural growth (determined by the 
stock level) just equals harvest. 
 
Figure 2 
Open Access Dynamics 
 
When the stock level is “wrong,” given economically-determined effort, 
natural growth and human harvest are not equal, and so the level of the 
stock will rise or fall. If for example, effort was eo but the stock level was at 
some value x’ which exceeded the value xo at which f(x) = h(x,eo), then as 
can be seen from the figure, we would have f(x’) < h(x’,eo)— natural growth 
would be less than harvest—and stock level would fall. Likewise, stock level 
would increase, given harvest effort eo, if it was initially below xo. 
The perspicacious reader will have noted that given the f(x) curve 
drawn in Figure 2, there are in fact two values of x for which f(x) = h(x,eo). 
This—the existence of multiple equilibrium points of zero net growth in the 
stock—will in fact be true anytime the slope of the f(x) function increases at 
first and then declines.11 While there are two equilibrium points, however, 
only one, xo, is stable in the sense that a small, random perturbation of the 
stock will be self-correcting. To see this, consider the lower equilibrium 
stock value x. If the stock were suddenly to jump above this level—due, say 
to an unusually favorable run of weather that increases the amount of food 
 
 11 In the bioeconomics literature, a natural growth function with such a shape is known as 
depensatory, in that the rate of growth is actually increasing for low levels of the stock. See 
CLARK, supra note 9, at 16–18. 
f(x) 
xx xm xo 
h(x,eo) 
hl(x,e) 
Stock 
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available and hence the population level—then it would be in a range in 
which natural growth f(x) exceeds harvest h(x,eo), and so the population 
would increase to xo. Conversely, were random events to cause a decrease in 
the stock from the point x, then it would be at a level at which natural 
growth was less than harvest, causing the stock to fall to zero. Thus, the 
equilibrium or stationary value x is not stable. 
 In terms of the biological impact of the economic incentives created by 
open access, what is most interesting about the natural growth function f(x) 
depicted by Figure 2 is not that there is an unstable low population level, but 
that open access incentives will drive the population discontinuously to zero 
long before that low level is ever reached. To see why this is so, suppose we 
begin at a biological-economic equilibrium (eo,xo), but that market price then 
begins to increase. From the analysis of market incentives, we know that as 
the market price goes up, so too does the zero profit level of harvest effort. 
Hence in Figure 2, as price goes up, the h(x,e) curve also shifts up, causing 
harvest to exceed growth, so that population falls. But as price continues to 
increase, and the h(x,eo) curve continues to rotate upward from the origin, 
eventually the only stationary point will be xm, the point where the slope of 
the f(x) (its steepness) is greatest. For any further increase in price and 
effort level harvest h(x,e) will exceed natural growth f(x) and the population 
will fall. This fall in population will not help the system equilibrate—by 
increasing the growth of the population—but will cause an even bigger 
decline in population growth. Unless harvest incentives weaken (the h(x,e) 
function shifts back down), the biological system will go from a stable but 
declining population to one of continuous decline to zero. 
Harvest incentives, given by equation (2), may or may not weaken. 
From that equation, we see that if the price increases stop soon after the 
population has been driven down to the level xm, then the continuous 
declines in population that begin at that point cause continuous declines in 
industry harvest. Beginning from an initial industry or open access market 
equilibrium at xm, where total revenues equal total costs, total costs will rise 
above total revenues. On average, harvesters will be losing money. If, as 
standard economic theory predicts, such losses trigger rapid exit from the 
industry, and total effort falls by a sufficiently large amount, then the harvest 
function will shift down dramatically to something like the h1(x,e) function 
in Figure 2. With so little harvest effort, natural growth now exceeds the 
harvest even at the low stock level xm. The stock will begin to increase, 
attracting new entrants to the market, thus pushing the harvest function 
h(x,e) back up. If the stock has not fallen too far, then the bioeconomic 
system may return to stable, steady state harvest at a level such as xo. 
Such a happy, self-correcting open access system is only a possible, not 
a necessary result. If a long period of price increases has increased harvest 
and brought the stock below xm, but harvesters are very slow to exit the 
industry, so that harvest remains above natural growth, the population may 
continue to fall. If industry exit is so slow that the population falls so far that 
it is below the level x, then even if industry exit does finally lower the 
harvest function h() , the population level may be so low that harvest still  
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exceeds growth, so that the population cannot grow back up to a stable 
level, but will continue its slide toward zero. 
In other words, whether or not open access harvest drives a resource 
stock to zero depends upon how market dynamics—the dynamic of entry 
and exit—compare with biological dynamics, the natural growth of the 
harvested resource stock.12 Generally speaking, the quicker harvesters exit 
when the stock becomes low and profits disappear, the lower the likelihood 
that open access harvest will drive the resource stock to zero. Market entry 
and exit decisions differ when harvesters base them on rational expectations 
about future harvest based on the current resource stock and aggregate 
harvest capacity rather than the most recent profit or loss experience. In 
particular, under rational expectations, harvesters will begin leaving the 
market even when the level of the resource stock and aggregate harvest 
effort is consistent with temporary positive profits and so would not trigger 
exit by myopic harvesters.13 Still, whether myopic or rational expectations 
drive harvesters’ market entry and exit decisions, the interplay between 
biological growth and economic entry and exit decisions is likely to generate 
cycles in an open access resource. When the stock is high and the number of 
harvesters is low, profits attract more harvesters. Such market entry lowers 
the stock and continues to occur until the stock is so low, relative to the 
number of harvesters, that harvesters are losing money. Such economic 
losses induce harvesters to leave the market, which eventually allows 
natural growth to exceed harvest so that the stock increases. Eventually the 
stock is so high that profitability returns, and the cycle begins again.14 
And what, finally, of true extinction, which occurs when the resource 
stock is driven to zero and cannot return ever again to a positive level? 
Extinction in this sense can result only if there is a minimum viable 
population, where this means that there is a level of the population xe such 
that f(x) ≤ 0 for all x < xe so that once x falls below xe, the population will fall 
inexorably to zero. Figure 3 depicts such a natural growth function (which is 
 
 12 To prove this formally requires that one specify a dynamic equation for market entry that 
is analogous to the dynamic equation for biological growth given by equation (1). Since Vernon 
L. Smith’s influential article, the standard way to model market entry and exit dynamics has 
been to assume that entry is proportional to present profits (or exit is proportional to loss). See 
Vernon L. Smith, Economics of Production from Natural Resources, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 409 
(1968). For demonstrations of how the interplay between such an economic dynamic and the 
biological dynamic determine extinction possibilities, see Jon M. Conrad, Bioeconomic Models 
of the Fishery, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 405, 408–412 (Daniel W. Bromley 
ed., 1995), and CLARK, supra note 9, at 190–192. The possibility of extinction depends very much 
on the shape of the natural growth function f(x) and of the harvesting cost function. Peter 
Berck has shown that in the “standard” bioeconomic model, where f(x) is assumed to be such 
that f(x) ≥ 0 and f’’(x) < 0 for all x (what is known as a “compensatory” growth function) and 
cost is linear, extinction cannot result. Peter Berck, Open Access and Extinction, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 877 (1979). That extinction is possible for more general natural growth 
functions and cost structures can be verified by working some of the problems that appear in 
CONRAD & CLARK, supra note 10, at 97–109. 
 13 This is illustrated by Peter Berck & Jeffrey M. Perloff, An Open-Access Fishery with 
Rational Expectations, 52 ECONOMETRICA 489 (1984). 
 14 For a demonstration of such cycling in the stock and harvest effort level, see CLARK, 
supra note 9, at 192. 
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known as critical depensation in bioeconomic literature). As the figure 
shows, if open access harvest is so intense and exit so slow that it pushes 
the population down to xe, then the natural growth rate in the population will 
become negative, so that even with a ban on all harvest, the stock will fall to 
zero. Small increases above zero, moreover, will not succeed in creating a 
viable population, for at such low levels the natural growth rate is negative. 
 
Figure 3 
Population Growth and Critical Value 
(Minimum Viable Population) 
 
2. Selected Implications of Harvest Dynamics for the Diagnosis and Cure of 
Problems of Overharvest and Extinction 
 
 a. Market Incentives are Not to Blame: Overharvesting by Native 
Peoples, and Long Term Market Cycles 
 
It is tempting to think that the problems of overharvest and potential 
resource extinction are due to market incentives—that if harvesters were 
not driven by the profit motive, then the bioeconomics of open access 
harvest would be less likely to drive resources to extinction. The underlying 
idea behind such thinking seems to be that it is relatively limitless market 
demand that accounts for overharvest and extinction, so that if harvesters 
were only catching fish or killing animals to feed themselves and their 
families, then their own limited needs would naturally moderate their 
harvest levels. 
Such thinking is supported neither by theory nor by historical evidence. 
As a theoretical matter, if harvest is not marketed but instead consumed, 
xxe 
f(x)
Stock 
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then a population of human harvesters is essentially the same as a 
population of animal predators, with the harvest level a simple function of 
the size of the (human) predator population and the population itself 
increasing in the harvest level.15 In such a world, it is possible that the 
bioeconomic system will settle into a stable or stationary state, with the 
human population generating a level of resource harvest such that both the 
human population and the resource stock will be forever unchanging.16 On 
the other hand, similar to cyclical market-induced dynamics, when the 
growth rate of the harvested population is relatively low and/or the growth 
of the human population is very responsive to the level of harvest, then the 
system tends to cycle around a positive level of the harvested resource. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, if the growth of the resource is 
sufficiently slow, the system will exhibit cyclical overshooting. Humans may 
have little impact on the resource for decades or even centuries, but as 
human population reaches a sufficiently high level, harvesting vastly 
exceeds resource growth, leading to resource collapse and also, if the 
resource is indeed critical to the human population, to a collapse in the 
human population as well.17 
The historical record of human subsistence societies is replete with 
evidence of such human-driven extinctions. The failed human civilizations of 
Easter Island, the Chaco Anasazi in the southwestern United States and 
ancient Mesopotamia all are cases in which resource harvest led to 
population growth that eventually exceeded the renewal capacity of the 
resource.18 More distantly, while scholars are no longer convinced that it 
was “man, and man alone” who was responsible for the mass animal 
extinctions that occurred at the end of Pleistocene period 11,000 years ago,19 
there is no longer any scientific question but that native peoples had huge 
impacts on their environment and accounted for at least some extinctions.20 
Just as it is not true that non-market societies necessarily manage their 
natural resources so as to avert extinction and resource collapse, so too has 
the long term pattern of market-driven exploitation exhibited precisely the 
sort of non-catastrophic cycling that the theoretical model predicts. Long 
term evidence on commercial fish harvesting strongly confirms the 
 
 15 For a model of such “Malthusian” population dynamics, see James A. Brander & M. Scott 
Taylor, The Simple Economics of Easter Island: A Ricardo-Malthus Model of Renewable 
Resource Use, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 119, 123–124 (1998). 
 16 See id. at 125 (displaying the “steady-state analysis”). 
 17 Id. at 128–131. 
 18 Easter Island illustrates the pattern most clearly, perhaps, in that the Jubea Palm—that 
was so crucial a food and resource for Easter Islanders—was not only uniquely large but also 
uniquely slow growing. Id. at 129–132. For an interesting, albeit less rigorous, account of the 
decline and extinction of the Easter Island and Anasazi civilizations as well as many others, see 
JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 79–328 (2005). 
 19 As classically stated by Paul W. Martin, Pleistocene Overkill, NATURAL HISTORY, Dec. 1967, 
at 36. Changing views on the role of native societies in this mass extinction are discussed in 
SHEPARD KRECH III, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN: MYTH AND HISTORY 29–43 (1999). 
 20 On newer models and evidence on settling and overhunting by Clovis Age peoples in 
North America, see PAUL A. DELCOURT & HAZEL R. DELCOURT, PREHISTORIC NATIVE AMERICANS 
AND ECOLOGICAL CHANGE: HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS IN EASTERN NORTH AMERICA SINCE THE 
PLEISTOCENE 142–160 (2004). 
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prediction of bioeconomic cycling. Almost a century of records on the 
annual catch of cod off the Lofoten Islands show not only cycling, but also 
relatively prolonged periods of relatively low (as well as high) catches and 
catch rates per fisherman.21 Likewise, a half-century of records on the 
French sardine fishery in Brittany and thirty years of records on the Fraser 
River sockeye salmon harvest also clearly depict dramatic oscillations, with 
periods of tremendous catches followed by crashes.22 Such dramatic and 
continuing oscillations in harvest have been observed for virtually every 
commercially valuable fish species; indeed, in the English herring fishery, it 
has been commented upon since the Middle Ages.23 As early as the late 
nineteenth century, commercial salmon harvest in the Pacific Northwest 
clearly depicted the paradox of bioeconomic cycling: increases in aggregate 
effort (such as gillnets) increased total harvest, but decreased individual 
productivity and earnings.24 
At the same time, there is clear historical evidence that if market exit 
does not occur quickly enough, then fish stocks can be harvested into 
extinction. In the United States, perhaps the most well-known instance of 
such extinction is provided by the California sardine fishery, where catches 
increased dramatically, with only a few leveling off periods, from the 
beginning of commercial operations in 1917 until 1946 when catches began a 
precipitous fall that ended in the complete collapse of the fishery in 1952.25 
Just as with the collapse of Easter Island, there are several biological 
characteristics of the California sardine fishery that, when plugged into the 
bioeconomic model, fully explain its relatively rapid extinction. First, 
sardines were valuable primarily because they could be reduced into 
fishmeal, the sale of which yielded huge profits, hence a market incentive for 
very high harvest effort levels.26 Second, and equally importantly, sardines 
are a schooling fish, which makes it possible to net very large quantities 
once a school is located. But sardines school even when their overall stock 
declines, so that harvest efficiency does not decline rapidly with a decline in 
the stock.27 Thus declines in sardine stocks do not cause a rapid decline in 
productivity. Coupled with high prices for fishmeal, this biological fact 
meant that exit from the industry would be relatively slow. Making 
extinction even more likely was that for sardines, as for other schooling 
fishes, the survival rate of the young is more or less independent of the size 
of the stock, making for a linear growth function. 28 As seen in Figure 1, with 
 
 21 TIM D. SMITH, SCALING FISHERIES: THE SCIENCE OF MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF FISHING: 
1855–1955, at 10–20 (1994). 
 22 Id. at 10–20. 
 23 Id. at 170. 
 24 JOSEPH TAYLOR, MAKING SALMON: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST 
FISHERIES CRISIS 140–147 (1999). 
 25 SMITH, supra note 21, at 239–254. 
 26 See ARTHUR F. MCEVOY, THE FISHERMAN’S PROBLEM, ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA 
FISHERIES, 1850–1980, at 145 (1986). McEvoy notes that the profits from producing fish meal 
from sardines were so high that during the 1930s the entire investment cost of a plant could be 
recovered in a single season. 
 27 Id. at 148. 
 28 Id. at 149. 
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a linear growth function f(x), once the harvest exceeds growth, the only 
thing that can prevent eventual extinction is exit from the industry. 
 
 b. Avoiding Human-Induced Extinctions: Patterns and Lessons of 
Institutional Adaptation and Change 
 
 i. What Does the Theory Recommend? 
 
While formal and highly stylized, the basic mathematical bioeconomic 
model of open access, rule of capture harvest teaches lessons for policies 
that may reduce the chance that open access harvest will lead to resource 
extinction. In keeping with the dual, biological/economic nature of the 
model, these are lessons that affect both the harvesting industry and the 
biological or physical dynamic of the resource. 
The first lesson is the most basic: The static efficiency of any particular 
level of resource exploitation may be a very poor indicator of what is 
dynamically efficient—efficient, that is, given the change in resource stock 
over time induced by a particular harvest level. Localized fishing industries, 
for example, often realize that their own profit maximization requires that 
they restrict entry into the fishery through exclusive fishing grounds and 
similar norms.29 Such localized stratagems allow the internalization of one 
kind of common pool externality—the effect that increasing one fisherman’s 
effort has in lowering the productivity of other fishermen’s efforts. Whether 
such strategies allow groups of fishermen to optimally manage the resource 
over time—taking account of how high present harvest levels will lower the 
stock and productivity in the future—is an entirely different matter. 
From this dynamic point of view—that of ensuring open access harvest 
is itself sustainable in that it does not push the resource to extinction—the 
model carries a second important lesson: The better a harvester group’s 
economic alternatives to harvesting a particular resource stock, and the 
cheaper it is for them to move to such alternatives, the better the chances 
that the biological-economic system will cycle around a relatively high level 
of the stock, with the stock never falling to zero. If, for example, harvesters 
are mobile hunter-gatherers with a large number of possible prey, then the 
model predicts that any particular prey stock does not need to fall very 
much before the hunters decide to move on to a better, more abundant prey. 
If, however, we have something like the Easter Island case, where the costs 
of moving on to a better environment are very high and harvesters have very 
little information about the returns such a move might bring them, then they 
are likely to stay and continue harvesting until the resource stock, and their 
own population, collapse. 
Hence policies that promote economic alternatives for resource 
harvesters, and increase their mobility, will systematically lessen the risk of 
economically driven resource collapse. Somewhat paradoxically, the last 
 
 29 A classic example of such exclusive territorial harvest rights is the Maine lobster fishery, 
described in detail in JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988), and modeled 
more rigorously in James M. Acheson & Roy M. Gardner, Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in 
the Maine Lobster Industry, 17 RATIONALITY & SOC. 309 (2005). 
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thing that one would want to see, from the point of view of encouraging a 
bioeconomic cycle that never pushes the resource stock too low, is a 
harvesting industry whose members have made very large, sunk investments 
in harvesting a particular resource, but which are worthless in other 
economic endeavors. 
This same argument condemns policies that encourage harvesters to 
remain attached to particular harvest activities despite very low resource 
stock levels—such as harvest subsidies and various forms of public aid to 
harvesting communities—as those policies likely deter biologically desirable 
exit and reduced aggregate harvest effort. However, care must be taken not 
to conflate fixed communities with sunk, specialized investments in 
particular harvest activities. Local communities that are almost entirely 
dependent upon harvest industries but that have lots of different resources 
available for harvest—such as multiple species of fish, or game in addition to 
fish—may actually illustrate stable and sustainable cycling among resources. 
As pressure on one resource increases, decreasing stock and productivity, 
harvesters may naturally move to other nearby resources. If such harvest 
alternatives are sufficiently abundant and productive, then in effect the local 
harvesting industry is highly mobile in the relevant sense, with rapid 
substitution away from overharvested resources. Conversely, a much more 
technologically sophisticated harvest industry that is perfectly mobile in the 
sense that it is not based in any particular community—such as offshore 
fishing fleets—may be far less mobile in the relevant economic sense, 
because it has a large, sunk investment in harvesting a particular resource 
(e.g. species), and cannot switch to harvesting other species without 
incurring large costs.30 
On the biological side, the fundamental lesson from the model is that 
different resources have different growth and decay dynamics. Some 
resource stocks are more resilient than others, able to bounce back even 
from very low stock levels, while for others, natural growth becomes 
negative when the stock falls too low. In particular, different biological 
species have varying ranges and migratory capabilities, with some limited to 
only a few locations from which members are unlikely to migrate to new 
habitats, while others are both widespread and easily mobile. There is 
indeed a striking parallel between the economic dynamics of human harvest 
and the biological dynamics of a harvested resource. The alternatives and 
the greater the mobility of individuals in finding those alternatives, the lesser 
the chance that open access human harvest will lead to an irreversible 
extinction of the resource.31 
Variation in resource resiliency carries two policy lessons. First, to 
prevent open access management from leading to disaster, one needs 
information about resource dynamics before resource stocks fall to such 
 
 30 For a more extended and concrete discussion, comparing the flexibility of the New 
England inshore fishery across species with the sunk costs and species-dependent nature of 
offshore fleets, see SUSAN R. PLAYFAIR, VANISHING SPECIES: SAVING THE FISH, SACRIFICING THE 
FISHERMAN (2003). 
 31 For an extended and much more illuminating discussion of this parallel than my 
discussion here, see GEERAT J. VERMEIJ, NATURE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY (2004). 
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low levels that they may have already passed the critical point at which 
extinction becomes inevitable and possibly irreversible. One needs to know 
not only where the critical level lies, but how that level is affected by larger 
environmental disturbances. The second lesson, little discussed, is the 
potential desirability of policies that attempt to increase the range of the 
resource. As recent concern over invasive and exotic species displays, 
transplanting species is fraught with uncertainty and risk, and adverse 
unanticipated consequences. However, for a species of especially high 
economic and social value, increasing the range and migratory capabilities 
of the species is, at least in principle, a potential way to prevent its collapse 
due to overharvest in any particular location. 
 
  ii. The Simple Political Economy of Perverse Open Access 
“Regulation”: The Coastal Fisheries Example 
 
Deep within the story of the collapse of the California sardine fishery is 
a small but important fact. Despite the high prices for sardines and sardine-
based fish meal that persisted during much of the 1930s and 1940s, declining 
stocks during that time may well have moderated fishing pressures. Such 
market forces, however, never had a chance to work, because with the 
advent of World War II, the federal government bought virtually the entire 
product of the sardine industry at very high prices; in 1945, the War Food 
Administration actually ordered the catch increased by one-third from very 
high levels.32 While we cannot be sure how significant these government 
policies were in encouraging unsustainable levels of the California sardine 
catch, they encouraged overharvest at a time when market forces alone 
would have encouraged industry exit and harvest decreases. Such policies 
illustrate a very general pattern: Observed governmental policies that 
regulate open access harvest have not only failed to meet the general 
theoretical prescriptions set out above, they have been, in many cases, 
contrary to the objective of preventing resource collapse. 
Most seriously, rather than pursuing policies that tend to create 
valuable alternatives to resource harvest, governments across the world 
have subsidized harvest, as in the case of the California sardine. This is true 
for resources ranging from fisheries to forests.33 Even worse, as resource 
stocks have declined, lowering the average return to harvesters, 
governments typically increase the subsidies, thus tending to keep harvest 
levels much higher, and for a far longer period, than they would be in the 
absence of subsidies.34 
Interestingly, government subsidies for open access harvest have 
generally increased when individual countries assert national ownership and 
control rights over the resource than when they do not. This is most 
dramatically illustrated by the case of coastal fisheries. Since 1945, countries 
 
 32 MCEVOY, supra note 26, at 153. 
 33 See NORMAN MYERS & JENNIFER KENT, PERVERSE SUBSIDIES: HOW TAX DOLLARS CAN 
UNDERCUT THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 148–186 (2001) (discussing government 
subsidization of natural resource harvests). 
 34 Id. at 152. 
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have increasingly asserted ownership rights over coastal ocean resources, a 
trend that culminated in 1983 with the United Nation’s authorization of the 
200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).35 Within these zones, coastal 
states have essentially unlimited jurisdiction over natural resources,36 and by 
the 1990s, the vast majority of coastal states had declared such zones, 
encompassing over ninety percent of the world’s fisheries.37 Among major 
powers, the United States led the way with the creation of a “Fishery 
Conservation Zone” that extended the limit of U.S. fisheries control from 12 
to 200 miles offshore.38 To regulate and control harvest of the newly 
nationalized coastal fisheries resource, the United States established a 
system of regional fisheries management councils.39 
The general failure of these councils to effectively manage America’s 
national fisheries, epitomized by the collapse and closure of the New 
England cod fishery, has been discussed at length by a number of authors.40 
However badly constructed, the council regulatory structure was doomed to 
fail because, as in virtually every other coastal state, the declaration by the 
United States of the EEZ generated a massive increase in fishing fleet size 
and capacity—an increase fueled by government subsidies. 
Government subsidization of fisheries has a long history,41 but the 
declaration of EEZs is remarkable in how it led to a vast expansion in such 
government involvement. Fishermen across the world had viewed the 
assertion of national jurisdiction over coastal fisheries as a way of protecting 
them against an onslaught of fishing competition from foreign fishing fleets. 
In the United States, fishermen lobbied for declaration of the EEZ because 
they believed it would simply exclude foreign fleets from American coastal 
 
 35 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 56–57, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 2004) (establishing the rights, 
jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal countries in EEZs). See Rognvaldur Hannesson, From 
Common Fish to Rights Based Fishing: Fisheries Management and the Evolution of Exclusive 
Rights to Fish, 35 EUR. ECON. REV. 397 (1991) (noting that significant economic changes in the 
global fishing industry have necessitated changes in the ownership rights of the sea). 
 36 Hannesson, supra note 35, at 398. 
 37 Gunnar Kullenberg, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Some Perspectives, 42 OCEAN & 
COASTAL MANAGEMENT 849, 850 (1999). 
 38 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94–265, 90 
Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§1801–1882 (2000). Such Exclusive Economic Zones were 
officially authorized and formally defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, supra note 35 arts. 56–57. 
 39 These are succinctly described in JOHN H. HEINZ CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND 
ENVIRONMENT, FISHING GROUNDS: DEFINING A NEW ERA FOR AMERICAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
26–27 (2000). For a discussion of the many problems and difficulties with these regional 
management councils, see MICHAEL L. WEBER, FROM ABUNDANCE TO SCARCITY 85–93 (2002), and 
PLAYFAIR, supra note 30, at 43–108. 
 40 See, e.g., PLAYFAIR, supra note 30, at 93–108 (discussing the failures of the New England 
Fishery Management Council). 
 41 As early as the 1830s, Newfoundland fishermen were complaining that the bounty system 
set up by the French government had stimulated the buildup of a French fleet of huge ships 
whose use of seine and set lines was severely depleting Grand and Sable Bank cod stocks. 
HAROLD A. INNIS, THE COD FISHERIES: HISTORY OF AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 375–377, 380–381 
(1954). According to Canadian observers, the French cod fleet was “more of a governmental 
affair than of private mercantile enterprise,” with the Marine Royale setting down detailed rules 
regarding the operation of each and every vessel. Id. at 380–381. 
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fishing grounds.42 In New England, for example, nationalization of fisheries 
was provoked by the arrival of foreign fleets of heavily subsidized modern 
factory trawlers, especially from the Soviet Union, who by 1965 were taking 
sixty-five percent of the Georges Bank haddock landings, leading to such a 
badly depleted Georges Bank haddock stock that foreign fleets then 
switched in 1966 to cod, which then led to a sustained fall in cod landings.43 
By the early 1970s there was a clear cut position among New England 
politicians that the decline of the New England fishing industry was the 
direct result of “foreign overfishing and the massive invasion of the foreign 
fleets during the early 1960s.”44 
To Congress and the fishing industry, the declaration of exclusive 
American fishing rights within the 200 mile zone was an opportunity to 
bolster and modernize the American fishing fleet. In addition to general 
subsidies, such as the investment tax credit, the United States designed 
financial subsidies for the fishing industry, including government-guaranteed 
boat-building loans at lower interest rates and for longer terms than 
traditional five-year boat loans.45 Coming on the heels of several very good 
harvest years, and with “visions of vast waters supposedly now lightly 
fished,”46 U.S. fisheries responded with a massive increase in fleet size and 
technological sophistication. In the Alaska pollock fishery alone, Congress 
guaranteed close to $65 million in low-interest loans to finance construction 
of ten factory trawlers, and by 1988, the federal government had used such 
loans to finance roughly eighty percent of the $520 million cost of the forty-
three U.S. owned factory trawlers in the fishery.47 In New England the 
number of boats in the groundfishing fleet doubled from 600 to 1200 boats 
between 1976 and 1982, and with new technologies the harvest capacity of 
the fleet grew even faster, with cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder 
landings doubling in only four years.48 These subsidies, combined with 
similar state subsidy programs, financed the largest buildup of U.S. fishing 
vessels in the history of the United States, with 13,340 documented fishing 
vessels built in the first ten years after the law’s passage, fully forty-four 
percent of all vessels built between 1950 and 1997.49 Notably, while the 
number of small boats declined forty percent between 1976 and 1996, the 
number of large vessels increased seventy percent, to almost 29,000.50 With 
so many large, highly efficient boats on the water, total landings—which in  
 
 
 
 42 See, e.g., MARGARET E. DEWAR, INDUSTRY IN TROUBLE: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE 
NEW ENGLAND FISHERIES, 132–147 (1983) (discussing efforts by fishing interests to protect 
fisheries from foreign fishing pressures). 
 43 Id. at 105–106. 
 44 Id. at 113. 
 45 DAVID DOBBS, THE GREAT GULF: FISHERMEN, SCIENTISTS, AND THE STRUGGLE TO REVIVE THE 
WORLD’S GREATEST FISHERY 103 (2000). 
 46 Id. at 104. 
 47 PLAYFAIR, supra note 30, at 202. 
 48 DOBBS, supra note 45, at 104. 
 49 WEBER, supra note 39, at 86. 
 50 Id. 
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1976 were near their average after World War II—grew sixty-six percent, 
while fishing income in 1996 was 2.5 times what it had been in 1976.51 
Essentially the same dynamic took place in virtually every coastal state: 
The nations’ fishermen lobbied for passage of the EEZ, and responding to 
their newly created exclusive sovereign rights, national governments then 
stepped up subsidies for fishermen leading to a vast increase in fishing 
capacity so that, ultimately, the worldwide fishing resource was subject to 
much greater harvest pressure than before the declaration of EEZs.52 Indeed, 
since the factory trawler fleets that descended upon coastal waters en masse 
beginning in the 1950s were themselves the product of massive government 
subsidies (or actually state owned, as in the case of the huge fleets sent from 
the communist Soviet Union and Eastern European countries), it is clear 
that government subsidies played a very significant role in the increase in 
worldwide fishing effort that occurred in the late twentieth century. This led 
to the collapse of ancient and valuable resource stocks, such as the cod 
fishery of the northwestern Atlantic. Far from encouraging flexible and 
responsive market responses to changing fish stocks, governments acted to 
directly increase the size and capacity of the fishing industry and then took 
steps to keep that industry from shrinking in response to declining stocks. 
While precisely the opposite of sustainable open access harvest, such 
policies have a natural political/economic explanation. In countries that are 
functioning representative democracies, democratically elected legislatures 
 
 51 Id. at 86–87. 
 52 For a short history of worldwide subsidies, see WILLIAM E. SCHRANK, INTRODUCING 
FISHERIES SUBSIDIES, FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 437 (2003). In Canada, landings of cod 
had varied cyclically over hundreds of years of open access fishing between 150,000 and 300,000 
metric tons annually, until the arrival of the Eastern European and Soviet factory freezer 
trawlers after World War II, with distant water fleet harvest from Canadian offshore waters—
Grand Banks and Flemish cap—increasing from 117,000 metric tons (39% of total) in 1956 to 
783,000 metric tons, and 85% of the total, in 1968. Christopher Finlayson & Bonnie J. McCay, 
Crossing the Threshold of Ecosystem Resilience: The Commercial Extinction of Northern Cod, 
in LINKING SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS 
FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE 311, 316 (Fikret Berkes, Carl Folke & Johan Colding eds., 1998). Just 
as in the United States, the Canadian fishing industry lobbied for the declaration of an exclusive 
national property right in the coastal fishery, and Canada responded by declaring a 200 mile 
EEZ in 1977. MIRIAM WRIGHT, A FISHERY FOR MODERN TIMES: THE STATE AND THE 
INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERY, 1934–1968, at 104–112, 152 (2001). Unlike 
U.S. coastal states, the provincial government of Newfoundland had spent over $53 million 
since the late 1940s on low interest loans and loan guarantees to subsidize the construction of 
frozen fish processing plants and deep sea trawlers, and due in part to these cost-lowering 
subsidies, Newfoundland has displaced New England as the primary supplier of groundfish to 
the U.S. frozen fish industry. Id. at 13–14, 81–88. The Canadian federal government got involved 
in fisheries subsidies in direct response to the arrival of foreign factory fleets, with the 1966 
Fisheries Development Act providing low rate loans for trawlers and fish processing plants. Id. 
at 141–145. This initiated a general Canadian federal policy favoring the construction of a large, 
technologically sophisticated trawler fleet, a policy that greatly accelerated after the declaration 
of the 200 mile EEZ, with increases in Canadian federal government subsidies for constructing 
new vessels and upgrading old ones, and for constructing new fish processing facilities. Id. at 
152. The subsidies had the predictable effect of increasing the number of fishermen licensed in 
Newfoundland threefold between 1974 and 1980. Finlayson & McCay, supra, at 320. The 
subsidies also helped to increase the number of fish processing plants from 89 in 1974 to 138 in 
1980, despite continuous declines in landings since 1985. WRIGHT, supra, at 152, 154. 
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oversee and control public regulatory agencies that manage public 
resources. It is my view that the model that best explains the behavior of 
such agencies is one that assumes that agencies manage natural resources 
so as to maximize their net political support, where political support is 
determined by legislators who represent the short-run interests of their 
constituents.53 More than almost any other industry, natural resource 
harvest industries are necessarily geographically concentrated near the 
location of the resource. Fishermen live in coastal towns near the waters 
they fish; loggers live in lumbering towns near the forests they log. 
Legislators from these harvesting districts are likely to be intensely 
concerned with protecting and even increasing the size of their local harvest 
industry. The last thing that legislators would want to encourage is exit from 
the industry, since exit also means an often severe short-run decline in local 
resource-dependent economies and a decline in local population—events 
that are generally inconsistent with re-election. Of course, legislators from 
resource harvesting districts are unlikely to be a majority in the legislature, 
but there is generally no reason for other legislators to take interest, one 
way or the other, in the highly theoretical and abstract matter of selecting 
policies that are, or are not, consistent with the long term sustainability of a 
particular resource. The median voter in Michigan, for instance, is likely to 
see no relation between the health of New England cod populations and her 
own welfare. 
Because resource harvest industries are so singularly, indeed almost 
uniquely, concentrated geographically, representative majoritarian 
legislatures are very likely to pass laws that have the objective of 
maintaining and subsidizing harvest industries, even when such policies 
threaten to drive resource stocks to zero. Legislation that requires resource 
management agencies to sustainably manage resource stocks, the harvest of 
which the legislature has in fact subsidized, is inherently self-contradictory. 
Such vague, contradictory legislation is good for legislators, in that it gives 
legislators the opportunity to proclaim that they have served everyone’s 
interests while preserving the option of ad hoc, politically motivated 
intervention in agency decision making. Even today, the politico-economic 
logic of legislative survival explains public resource management statutes, 
not the bioeconomics of sustainable resource management.54 
A similar politco-economic logic explains another quite remarkable 
thing about the crisis of global fisheries; that the crisis occurred after, and in 
large part, as a direct result of the declaration of EEZs by coastal states. In 
order to exclude, or at least regulate, competition from foreign factory 
 
 53 For a formalization of such a model, applied to explain why statutes that require 
regulatory cost-benefit analysis may not have their intended effects, see Jason Johnston, A 
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1343 (2002). 
 54 My discussion here has focused on fisheries, but for a striking example of a statute that 
vaguely encourages such goals as “sustainability” while preserving ample room for Congress to 
intervene to pressure the relevant agency to adopt policies that preserve jobs and resource 
communities, see the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 472a, 521b, 1600, 
1611–1614 (2000) (amending Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476). 
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fleets, coastal states declared EEZs. With less foreign harvest pressure, 
coastal states and their national fishing industries saw an opportunity to 
increase government subsidies for the buildup of their own fleets. They 
succeeded in bolstering their own fleets and increasing employment in 
fisheries. But this buildup led to an even larger and more vociferous fisheries 
constituency—more vociferous because it is one thing to ask for 
government help, but quite another for the government to refuse to help 
after it has itself funded the very industry expansion that has caused the 
resource crisis. With more political pressure, subsidies increased rather than 
declined when resource stocks began to succumb to increased harvest 
pressure. The declaration of exclusive national rights by coastal fishing 
nations was a response to an international rule of capture dynamic among 
competing fishing nations, a dynamic in which coastal states had fallen 
behind in building up technologically advanced factory fleets. While we 
cannot run the experiment in reverse, coastal states were so far behind that 
it is hard to imagine them subsidizing the expansion of their own national 
fishing fleets without the competitive protection afforded by EEZs. Hence, 
while the declaration of EEZs did, at least in some cases, cut the level of 
harvest by the Soviet, Japanese and Eastern European factory fleets, it also 
stimulated a large, and in some cases more than offsetting, buildup of 
publicly subsidized coastal nation fleets. 
This is not a prediction that one can reach within the context of the 
model of a competitive open access fishery, because at the level of nation 
states, the game is not one of perfect competition but of strategic 
interdependence. In such a strategic world, not only do governments adopt 
policies to maximize political support rather than to maximize profits, but 
each government’s optimal policy depends upon its expectations regarding 
the actions of other governments. When a few countries were already far 
ahead in financing, building and operating distant water fishing fleets, the 
optimal level of coastal nation fleet investment was lower than when such 
distant fleets were excluded. I believe that an important lesson from the late 
twentieth century fishing stock collapses is that in a strategic world, where 
“property” rights are national rather than private, the declaration of such 
exclusive sovereign rights may actually exacerbate overharvest incentives. 
Although I have spoken exclusively of the incentives of democratically 
elected legislatures, I do not mean to suggest that representative 
democracies are by any means the worst at managing their publicly owned 
natural resources. In many developing countries with weak or corrupt 
political institutions, there is abundant evidence that corrupt and impatient 
political elites have managed national natural resources so as to maximize 
their own short term gains from resource harvest, with no regard either for 
resource preservation or even for present value maximization.55 What I do 
mean to suggest is that natural resource collapse is due primarily to political, 
institutional structures that encourage resource harvest well beyond the  
 
 
 55 See generally WILLIAM ASCHER, WHY GOVERNMENTS WASTE NATURAL RESOURCES: POLICY 
FAILURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1999) (discussing the political and programmatic reasons 
for the adoption of wasteful natural resource policies in third world countries). 
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point at which competitive, open access economic incentives would have 
dictated market exit and declining harvests. 
 
  iii. Some Realism About the Role of Science 
 
 I thus disagree with a very large and seemingly growing literature that 
encourages the belief that natural resource collapse is due to inadequate 
science and/or the failure of policymakers to properly understand and 
respond to scientific understanding of resource dynamics. This literature 
implies that if only we could spend more money on science, and then let 
scientists, rather than politicians, determine how publicly-held, open access 
resources are managed, then overharvest and resource collapses could be 
avoided. In a recent discussion of the collapse of the Canadian cod fishery, 
for instance, Finlayson and McCay do acknowledge the role played by 
massive government subsidies,56 but what they really emphasize are the 
errors in the assessment of the size of the cod stock. They find particular 
fault with a 1982 report by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), 
an agency that was a creature of the 200 mile EEZ declaration, claiming that 
the stock rebuilding process was well underway and predicting that the 1987 
quota would be 400,000 metric tons, with a long term sustainable yield of 
500,000 metric tons.57 The DFO did not realize until 1989 that it had seriously 
overestimated stock size, by as much as 100%, while mortality had been 
underestimated by 50%. As a result, the quotas had been too high and had to 
be quickly and drastically reduced. There were a number of reasons for 
these drastic errors in estimating stock size and growth,58 errors that are 
virtually inevitable in estimating something as complex as the stock-growth 
relationship (more generally known as the stock-recruitment relationship). 
However, the policy response to scientific uncertainty—to lower fishing 
quotas and manage conservatively59—can hardly be undertaken politically 
when, as in the Canadian (and the United States’) case, the federal 
government has been pumping hundreds of millions of dollars into subsidies, 
creating a vastly larger and vastly more efficient national cod fishing fleet. 
More generally, greater attention needs to be paid to the political 
economy of biological and ecological knowledge. Knowledge about the 
 
 56 Finlayson & McCay, supra note 52, at 320 (“[G]overnment policy played a strong role in 
shaping this tragedy of the commons.”). 
 57 Id. at 321–322. 
 58 According to Finlayson and McCay, some of the error was due to bad science, as in 
treating cod as a unit stock when in fact there were several distinct populations with different 
migratory patterns and an underestimation of natural mortality and its variability. Others 
reflected a certain fundamental lack of understanding about using catch data to estimate stock, 
as in the DFO’s persistent refusal to listen to reports of declining yield and size by inshore 
fishermen, while not adjusting the good yields from the offshore fleet to take account of the fact 
that new technologies were resulting in many more fish per unit of labor effort, by among other 
things, targeting cod when they concentrated to spawn on the offshore slopes of the banks. Id. 
at 321–328. 
 59 For a formal demonstration that this is indeed an optimal policy response given 
uncertainty, see Anastasios Xepapadeas & Catarina Roseta-Palma, Instabilities and Robust 
Control in Fisheries (Univ. of Crete, Working Paper No. 110.2003, 2003), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=486066. 
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biological dynamics of a publicly owned and regulated natural resource is 
itself a public good, in that it is generally made available to, and can be used 
by, any interested and informed person. Like any other public good, the level 
of its provision is determined politically. To continuously study and monitor 
the dynamic behavior of all natural resource stocks would entail a vast 
expenditure of public funds. Moreover, with the vast majority of such stocks 
far from critical levels, incurring the cost of such continuous monitoring 
would not make economic sense and would certainly be low on the list of 
governmental funding priorities. As a matter of stylized historical fact, 
legislators generously fund science only when there is a crisis that affects a 
locally important harvest industry and the survival of a very well known and 
popular or economically important species.60 By the time there is a demand 
for knowledge, it may be too late to save the resource. 
 
  iv. The Limited Possibilities of Privatization 
 
If governments actually have an incentive to increase the likelihood that 
open access harvest will lead to resource collapse, then one might suppose 
that the opposite regime—exclusive private ownership—might do better. 
After all, for a single owner, the aggregate industry level of effort is equal to 
her own individual effort level. Thus, she internalizes the effort externality—
both current effort and past effort (through its effect on present stock level). 
An economically rational owner will maximize the discounted present value 
of profits from harvest, given the natural rate of resource growth. Whether, 
however, the single owner’s intertemporal harvest and management scheme 
is socially desirable depends upon how the single owner discounts the 
future. If the single owner discounts the future at a rate that is very high 
relative to the natural growth rate of the stock, and the price is sufficiently 
high, then it will be optimal for her to harvest until extinction.61 If a fish 
stock is growing at only three percent annually, but the market interest rate 
(a profit maximizing owner’s discount rate) is six percent, then the owner 
would maximize her intertemporal profits by harvesting the stock as quickly 
as possible and investing the proceeds of sale. At the extreme, a single 
owner that has an infinitely high discount rate would choose precisely the 
same level of rent-dissipating harvest as results under open access (in that 
 
 60 In the case of marine ecosystem research, the best example is the Steller sea lion 
program. In the year 2000, a federal court blocked the Pollock trawling season because it found 
that the National Marine Fisheries Service had violated the federal Endangered Species Act by 
failing to adequately assess the impact of Pollock trawling on the Aleutian Islands Steller sea 
lion population. In response, Alaska Senator Ted Stevens pushed through a rider to a federal 
appropriations bill, which allowed Pollock fishing to continue while the National Research 
Council funded research on the causes of the decline in the Steller population. As of 2005, the 
federal government had spent $120 million on the Steller research initiative, a far greater 
amount than is spent on many endangered marine animals that are much closer to extinction, 
indeed an amount so large that one biologist working on the Steller initiative described it as 
“obscene.” See Rex Dalton, Conservation Biology: Is This Any Way to Save a Species?, 436 
NATURE 14, 15 (2005). 
 61 For formal treatment of the single owner case, including the extinction possibility, see 
CLARK, supra note 9, at 39–62. 
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with such discounting, she, like open access harvesters, has no interest in 
the level of the future stock). Conversely, a single owner who does not 
discount the future at all would choose a harvest level that maximizes long 
term, infinitely sustainable economic rents. 
Because rational private resource owners manage harvest levels over 
time, so as to maximize the present value of the resource, policies designed 
to prevent a private owner from collapsing the resource necessarily differ 
from those that are appropriate under open access competition. A private 
owner is likely to avoid harvesting to extinction when the resource is 
growing at a higher rate than the current market of interest (because the 
owner will make more in terms of increased stock value than she would get 
by harvesting and investing). In other words, the private owner harvests 
slowly when investing in the resource stock generates a higher return over 
time than alternative investments, and by the same token will harvest 
quickly to extinction when the resource is slow-growing and the market 
return on investments is high. Such a self-interested calculus ignores social 
values that inhere in resource preservation but which do not generate 
revenue for the owner. Such social value may arise for any number of 
reasons, notably the value of a particular harvest species in maintaining the 
health and resiliency of a larger ecosystem.62 Whatever the resource, a 
private owner will manage it so as to promote its market value, not its 
natural or biological value. When such natural or biological values have 
significant social value, private incentives may well dictate that the resource 
be entirely used up (made extinct) even when extinction is not socially 
desirable.63 
Such a divergence is a classic instance of externalities from resource 
use that arise under both private ownership and open access. The general 
 
 62 The external impact of resource harvest on species biodiversity and ecosystem health is a 
central concern in many contemporary natural resource management controversies. For recent 
literature dealing with these effects on ocean fisheries and western United States rangeland 
grazing, see respectively DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVISITED: REMOVING 
LIVESTOCK FROM PUBLIC LANDS TO CONSERVE NATIVE BIODIVERSITY 114–160 (2002) (detailing the 
impacts of cattle and sheep grazing on native ecosystems and ecosystem diversity), and Boris 
Worm et al., Global Patterns of Predator Diversity in the Open Oceans, 309 SCIENCE 1365 (2005) 
(finding that tuna and billfish diversity declined between 10 and 50% over the last 50 years, 
indicating that ecosystem-wide changes are occurring due to climate and fishing pressure). 
 63 Only recently have economists extended the bioeconomic harvest model, set out earlier, 
to deal with the biological dynamics that arise when species interact in an ecosystem. See 
William A. Brock & Anastasios Xepapadeas, Management of Interacting Species: Regulation 
Under Nonlinearities and Hysteresis, 26 RES. & ENERGY ECON. 137 (2004) (analyzing the optimal 
regulation of an open access fishery under two management regimes: social optimal, and 
rational expectations competitive equilibria with full property rights). For a formal 
demonstration that an owner who values both profits and biodiversity will harvest less and 
maintain a higher equilibrium stock, see Chuan-Zhong Li, Karl-Gustaf Lofgren, and Martin L. 
Weitzman, Harvesting versus Biodiversity: An Occam’s Razor Version, 18 ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 
355 (2001). Note that when only profits matter, socially and privately, extinction may be socially 
and privately optimal. Furthermore, private and social incentives as to the timing of extinction 
will coincide if the private and social rates of discount are identical. See Maureen L. Cropper, 
Dwight R. Lee & Sukhraj Singh Pannu, The Optimal Extinction of a Renewable Natural 
Resource, 6 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 341 (1979); Maureen L. Cropper, A Note on the Extinction 
of Renewable Resources, 15 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 64 (1988). 
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policy approaches for harmonizing social and private incentives when there 
are large social but not private benefits from resource preservation are well 
known.64 Rather than rehash them, I turn now to explore the surprising 
generality of the dynamic story about resource use told by the rule of 
capture, open access harvest model. In particular, I ask whether the market 
forces that lead to environmental pollution and overdevelopment of land 
might not also be self-correcting, in the same way that open access fisheries 
sometimes are. 
 
III. THE RULE OF CAPTURE AND THE POLLUTION PROBLEM 
 
The rule of capture—open access—applies to more than just the case in 
which a natural resource generates a marketable flow of goods or services. 
It is also the baseline management rule that applies when natural resources 
are used to dispose of wastes from productive activities. In the unregulated 
state, the rule of capture applies both when a pulp and paper mill located 
next to a river draws clean river water as an input into its production 
process and when it disposes of wastewater from its process back into that 
same river. Insofar as industrial waste disposal into air and watersheds is 
governed by an open access, first-in-time management regime, it is 
reasonable to think that the same models that illuminate problems of 
overharvest under the rule of capture might also illuminate the problems of 
air and water pollution. 
The problem is that whether applied to asset flows or asset stocks, the 
standard economic models of the rule of capture (open access), that I have 
explicated above, ask whether the rule of capture generates optimal levels 
or timing of resource use, given that the only externalities are among users 
of the same type. That is, those models are designed to get at questions such 
as whether the rule of capture leads to an economically desirable level of 
fish that are harvested, or oil that is pumped, over time. With air and water 
pollution the problems seem different. Unlike fishermen or oil producers, 
the pollution problem is not that individual polluters fail to internalize the 
harm their pollution does to other users of the same type (other polluters), 
but that they fail to internalize the harm that their activity does to other 
competing users. From a dynamic point of view, the pollution problem is not 
 
 64 For a discussion of solutions to the problem of divergent private and social incentives in 
the context of forest management (one where the resource stock is often privately owned), see 
TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 263–275 (5th ed. 2000).  
My discussion here does not deal with the very important and popular policy of awarding 
tradeable private permits to use a publicly owned resource. While it is clearly more efficient 
than a similar limit without tradeable permits (because trading gets the permits into the hands 
of those who are the most efficient users of the resource), regulated use with tradeable use 
rights does not solve the fundamental externality problem, which is to set a cap on total use 
that takes account of external effects. This is illustrated by the case of fisheries, where 
tradeable permits do not by themselves solve the problem of socially inefficient bycatch.  See, 
e.g., John R. Boyce, An Economic Analysis of the Fisheries Bycatch Problem, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. 
& MGMT. 314, 331–333 (1996) (showing that when the bycatch species has existence value, a 
system of individually transferable quotas does not induce socially optimal internalization of the 
social cost of bycatch). 
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that the stock may be driven to zero and exhausted too soon, but that other 
uses may be foreclosed. 
The first problem—of static externalization of the harm of pollution—is 
in fact the same for resource pollution as for resource harvest. Just as 
harvesters fail to take account of the impact of the negative effect of their 
harvest effort in lowering the productivity of other harvesters, so too do 
polluters fail to take account of the negative effect of their use of the 
resource—as a waste depository—on other users of the resource. Just as the 
rule of capture leads to overharvest (rent dissipation), so too does the rule 
incentivize too much pollution. 
 
A. A Dynamic Harvest Model of the Pollution Problem 
 
As we have seen, the dynamics of open access harvest are controlled by 
two equations. One equation shows how harvest interacts with natural 
growth to determine equilibrium or steady state stock growth, and the other 
shows how entry and exit into the harvest game are determined by the 
present or expected future profitability of the game. In this two equation 
system, as harvest goes up, equilibrium stock size falls, lowering the return 
to harvest and tending to drive harvesters out of the market, leading the 
system to cycle around an interior stable point—that is, a positive value for 
the resource stock or population. 
Analogously, there are two equations that similarly determine the 
dynamic behavior of open access pollution. Industries that pollute the air 
and water very often need clean air and water as inputs to their production 
process, and their average (and marginal) productivity typically falls when 
the level of air and water pollution gets too high. Indeed, even for a 
completely modern business, the cleanliness of a local airshed and waterway 
will affect its attractiveness to employees and its cost of offering those 
employees basic services, such as water and air, that help define the quality 
of the workplace environment. Hence, just as harvesters enter a resource 
market until the level of the stock is so low that entry is no longer profitable, 
so too will various industrial and other users enter a particular local 
resource market until the level of pollution is so high that it is no longer 
profitable to locate there. To illustrate, let us simplify by assuming that there 
is a single industrial user—pulp and paper mills on a river—just as we 
assumed a single type of harvester. Then given that pollution of the river 
managed on an open access, capture basis, we have that pulp mills enter and 
use and pollute the river until: 
(3) 0),( =− ceyepq , 
where p is the price for the paper mill output, c is the cost per unit of non-
natural-resource inputs and e is the level of such inputs, and y gives the 
ambient level of pollution—the quality after pollution—of the local natural 
resource stock. In general, ∂q/∂y ≤ 0, so that output is non-increasing in the 
level of ambient pollution.  
Just as with resource harvest, we need another equation to be able to 
solve for the equilibrium level of productive use and pollution of a local 
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natural resource. Unlike resource harvest, which directly affects resource 
quantity, it is most natural to think of resource pollution as directly affecting 
the quality of a natural resource such as a stream. However, just as the 
impact of any given harvest on the size of a resource stock depends upon the 
level of the stock, so too does the effect of any given flow of waste on the 
quality of an air or watershed depend upon the size of the flow of the 
pollutant relative to the existing ambient level of the pollutant in the 
resource. If the ambient level of the pollutant is low, then even a relatively 
high flow rate of the pollutant may have very little impact on the quality of 
the resource stock. For higher ambient levels, however, even small increases 
in flow may begin to lower the stationary or steady-state quality of the 
resource. This is just to say that for any given pollutant, a natural resource 
such as an airshed or watershed has a natural carrying capacity, that is, a 
natural ability to absorb pollution. Just as the growth of a natural resource 
stock depends upon the level of the stock, so too does the carrying capacity 
of a resource of a given size depend upon its existing level of pollution. 
The following equation formalizes this relationship between the flow of 
pollution, the resource’s existing carrying capacity, and the change in its 
state: 
(4) )()),((/ ygyeqEdtdyy −==& , 
where E(q(e y)), the flow of pollution, increases with output (so that ∂E/∂q 
> 0), and g(y) is the rate at which the pollutant is degraded or absorbed by 
ambient biological and/or chemical processes. Just as the growth rate of a 
harvested resource stock is a function of the level of the stock, so too is the 
rate at which a resource degrades or decomposes a pollutant a function of 
the ambient concentration of the given polluting substance.65 
Equation (4) expresses a fundamental biogeochemical fact that extends 
far beyond interaction between humans and their environment. Pollution, in 
the sense of waste from resource consumption, is a basic fact of nature. 
Indeed, the general theory of consumer-resource interactions, based on the 
law of conservation of matter, says that “X consumer biomass + Y resources 
→ X consumer biomass + aY new consumer biomass + (1 – a)Y waste 
products.”66 Many human “pollutants” are both used and produced by living 
organisms. For such pollutants, there is a natural, positive threshold level of 
pollutant concentration (quality y) so that if concentration were to fall below 
this, natural processes would bring it back up (that is, g(y) is negative for y 
below the threshold—the pollutant is being produced, rather than absorbed, 
on net). There are many examples of such natural production processes. In 
the oceans, organic compounds are both produced and released by marine 
organisms; indeed, a leading textbook author summarizes that “most marine 
organic matter is produced in situ as a result of biological activity,” with 
living organisms responsible for all of the production of particulate organic 
 
 65 This is a standard formulation, one version of which (assuming a constant rate of 
degradation) is presented in JON M. CONRAD, RESOURCE ECONOMICS 101 (1999). 
 66 ROBERT W. STERNER & JAMES J. ELSER, ECOLOGICAL STOICHIOMETRY: THE BIOLOGY OF 
ELEMENTS FROM MOLECULES TO THE BIOSPHERE 180 (2002). 
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matter.67 Various atmospheric gases are produced by marine and terrestrial 
systems, such as hydrogen sulfide and dimethyl sulfide (both via direct 
emission from sediments, soils and plants, and from microbial 
decomposition of sulfur-containing organics); carbon monoxide is both 
produced and consumed by a wide variety of microbes, fungi and plants, and 
very efficiently consumed by soil; natural halomethanes, which are 
greenhouse gases, are produced by microbial decomposition and contribute 
to natural or background levels of ozone depletion; most well known, 
perhaps, methane is produced by all kinds of natural systems, ranging from 
wetlands to the digestive systems of many invertebrate and vertebrate 
herbivores.68 Used in agricultural fertilization, nutrients such as nitrogen and 
phosphorous run off into rivers and lakes, but these water bodies 
themselves have baseline levels of such nutrients, in that not only are 
nutrients recycled by a whole range of biological consumers, from bacteria 
on up,69 but such consumers also produce nutrients.70 In rivers, nutrient 
concentrations are the result of meteorological precipitation chemistry, 
weathering, human nutrient transports and uses, uptake and retention within 
the watershed, and in situ sedimentation and conversions such as 
denitrification.71 The primary productivity of all kinds of ecosystems, 
ranging from lakes and temperate streams, to grasslands and forests, is 
increased when the system is fertilized, and such fertilization may change, in 
potentially desirable ways, the community structure of such ecosystems.72 
Perhaps most crucially of all, one must remember that what makes earth 
unique is the presence of free oxygen (O2), but O2 is here only because it is 
produced by living organisms. Indeed, earth began with very low levels of  
O2, and these levels increased only when photosynthetic organisms 
evolved.73 
Of course, a very basic list of human pollutants would have to include 
not only nutrients, organic matter, and various naturally generated gases, but 
also microorganisms, petroleum, radionuclides, trace metals, and a number 
of artificial substances that include high molecular weight aromatics such as 
PCBs, polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons, pesticides (made by adding an 
unsaturated carbon ring to an organic compound to make it toxic), low 
molecular weight, volatile organic compounds such as freons, and 
organometallic compounds. Many of these are not produced naturally, and 
for such pollutants, the only “natural” process is degradation or dilution (in 
terms of the above mathematical formalism, the function g(y) is always 
 
 67 SUSAN M. LIBES, AN INTRODUCTION TO MARINE BIOGEOCHEMISTRY 394 (1992). 
 68 T. FENCHEL, ET AL., BACTERIAL BIOGEOCHEMISTRY: THE ECOPHYSIOLOGY OF MINERAL CYCLING 
219–226 (2d ed. 1998). 
 69 STERNER & ELSER, supra note 66, at 244. 
 70 Id. at 230–261. Crustacean zooplankton have been estimated to contribute 20–25% of 
particulate phosphorous in lakes. Id. at 319. 
 71 Id. at 329. 
 72 Id. at 339–340. It is important to note that because of the energy cost of breaking the 
triple bond in the N2 molecule, there are very few marine organisms that can “fix” nitrogen, the 
most notable being blue-green algae and spartina saltmarsh grass, so most fixed nitrogen in 
oceans comes from river runoff. FENCHEL ET AL., supra note 68, at 178–180. 
 73 FENCHEL ET AL., supra note 68, at 210–213. 
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above zero). For example, human activity (primarily using leaded gasoline 
for auto fuel) is responsible for putting most of the lead into marine 
environments; lead has no stimulatory effect at any level and is toxic to 
marine organisms even at relatively low thresholds.74 Mercury, by contrast, 
is naturally produced in marine environments.75 Even pollutants that are not 
naturally produced will generally degrade when placed into the 
environment. Pesticides are, generally speaking, degraded both by biological 
organisms and by chemical processes.76 
Thus from the point of view of the formal biogeochemical dynamics 
captured by equation (4), there would seem to be two empirically important 
cases: one involving a human pollutant that is also produced naturally (so 
that there is a threshold level of ambient concentration below which the 
level will actually increase back up to the threshold even without human 
involvement), and one involving a human pollutant that is not found 
naturally (and for which the natural system has only the capacity to degrade 
or assimilate). 
A bit more precisely, for a “natural” pollutant, if the ambient 
concentration (or “quality”) ever drops below a critical level yc (that is, g(y) 
< 0 for all y such that 0 ≤ y < yc), is in natural equilibrium at this critical level 
(so that g(yc) = 0) and then begins to eliminate the pollutant, initially at 
increasing effectiveness (so that g’(y) is positive up to some value Y of the 
pollutant), but eventually at decreasing effectiveness, so that g’(y) < 0, for y 
≥ Y. Such an assimilation function g(y) depicts a resource that naturally has 
a positive level of some “pollutant,” and which is initially increasingly 
effective in assimilating the pollutant, but which eventually becomes so 
clogged with the pollutant that its ability to assimilate the pollutant becomes 
very weak. For non-natural pollutants, the difference is that the g(y) function 
is never negative. 
 
 74 For a general discussion of these pollutants, see LIBES, supra note 67, at 603–645, and for 
lead in particular, see id. at 626–627. 
 75 Indeed, when accurate methods of measuring environmental mercury concentrations 
were developed in the 1970s, it was discovered that most marine and aquatic fish have levels 
high enough to represent a health threat. However, the initial supposition that anthropogenic 
pollution had caused such concentrations was shown to be incorrect, as analysis of museum 
specimens showed that species such as tuna and swordfish simply have naturally high mercury 
concentrations. Indeed, some swordfish have high enough natural concentrations so that 
consumption of even “ reasonable amounts” of the species would cause a person to exceed her 
daily recommended mercury intake. LIBES, supra note 67, at 627. 
 76 The compounds into which pesticides degrade may be more or less harmful to aquatic 
and marine organisms than are the parent compounds. For examples of recent research on the 
process of pesticide degradation that attempt to assess the toxicity of the degradation (or 
transformation) compounds, see, Chris J. Sinclair & Alistair B.A. Boxall, Assessing the 
Ecotoxicity of Pesticide Transformation Products, 37 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 4617 (2003); and A.C. 
Belfroid et al., Relative Risks of Transformation Products of Pesticides for Aquatic Ecosystems, 
222 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T. 167 (1998). 
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Figure 4 
Open Access Pollution 
 
Just as equations (1) and (2) determined the steady state level of the 
population, so too do equations (3) and (4) determine the equilibrium 
amount of pollution—steady state resource quality. The market equilibrium 
of Equation (3) is depicted in Figure 4. As in Figure 1, market incentives 
determine equilibrium effort, output, and hence the amount of pollution. 
Equation (4), depicted in Figure 5, then shows what is happening to the level 
of pollutant in the river, given the flow of human pollution and the existing 
level of pollution. Importantly, unlike resource harvest—which is 
increasingly productive, the higher the resource stock—resource pollution, 
given by the pollution function E(q(e,y)) in Figure 5, is decreasing in 
pollution. This is true when, as assumed, productivity declines with 
pollution. 
eeo 
c · e 
$ 
p · q(e,yo) 
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Figure 5 
The Dynamics of Pollution 
 
Using Figures 4 and 5, we can see how the combined market-biological 
system moves, beginning from an initial level of ambient pollution given by 
y0. Given this level of stock pollution, equation (3) determines an 
equilibrium, open access level of effort e0. With this effort level, we have the 
pollution function E0(y) in Figure 5. The intersection of E0(y) and the g(y) 
function in Figure 5 gives the stationary value of stock ambient pollution, y0 , 
that is consistent with market-determined pollution. Were the ambient 
pollution level greater than this, the natural uptake of the pollutant would be 
greater than the flow of pollution, so that the level of pollution would fall. 
This would increase productivity, increasing effort and output, and shifting 
the pollution function E0 out. The system would eventually equilibriate at a 
new, higher effort and output level, but lower level of pollution. 
The implication of Figures 4 and 5 is remarkable for being so little 
realized. Even in a highly polluted resource, when the pollution flow is high, 
but less than the amount that the resource is itself using up, the natural 
system will self-correct, lowering pollution and increasing output until the 
level of pollution is at just that level which the resource itself can assimilate. 
I do not mean to suggest that this happy result is by any means the 
norm. A crucial assumption underlying it is that industry productivity q(e,y) 
is negatively impacted by ambient pollution. If we instead take an industry in 
which ambient pollution has no effect on productivity, then increasing 
ambient pollution does not harm the polluters at all, and there is no fall in 
output with increasing pollution. In the worst case, with continuously 
declining g(y)—so that above yc the system has permanently lost its ability to 
assimilate or take up the pollutant, but actually produces more of it—any 
industrial pollution will cause maximal pollution of the resource. 
Eo(y) 
yo yc 
g(y) 
Pollution 
Flow 
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This worst case scenario is possible only when ambient pollution has 
no deleterious effect on industrial productivity. Perhaps most interestingly, 
one can have a situation where only the lower level of pollution is stable. In 
such a case, if we begin with the higher stationary level, but then can 
somehow lower the ambient level even by a small amount, the system will 
self-correct to a new, lower level. Conversely, if the ambient level is ever 
perturbed even slightly above the higher stationary level, then the system 
will move to such a high level of pollution that it has lost all assimilative 
capacity. 
 
B. Policy Implications of the Dynamic Harvest Model of Pollution 
 
As the previous discussion indicates, unlike resource harvest—where it 
is clear that all harvesters suffer when overharvest reduces the stock—there 
are two cases with polluters: One in which polluters are harmed by the 
pollution that they cause, and another in which they are unaffected. 
Although the first situation has typically been ignored in traditional 
economic modeling of pollution, both are empirically important. 
Importantly, the policy responses to curbing pollution are quite different in 
these two different situations. 
In the first case, where firms are harmed by high levels of ambient 
pollution, pollution lowers profits and will eventually cause firms in a 
particular industry to either support local environmental cleanup or to leave 
a polluted location for a cleaner and more profitable local environment. To 
the extent that firms are searching for relatively pristine resources that they 
will both use and pollute, there is a natural equilibrium, where once a 
resource becomes sufficiently polluted, not only will the resource no longer 
attract new users, but existing users will, when their capital investments in 
plant and equipment have been sufficiently amortized, begin exiting from 
use. Users will move from locations with heavily developed, polluted 
resources to locations with relatively undeveloped, pristine resources. 
Importantly, if the net benefit from moving is sufficiently low—because, for 
example, it is costly for firms to move to less developed, cleaner locations—
and firms remain in heavily polluted local environments, then they are better 
off when all firms in the industry spend to reduce their pollution than when 
none do. Moreover, given that other firms in the same industry are spending, 
a firm does not put itself at a competitive disadvantage when it also 
complies with regulations that require money to be spent on pollution 
reduction. 
This analysis uncovers the economic logic behind two signal features of 
contemporary American federal environmental regulation. First, by imposing 
minimum regulatory requirements even on relatively pristine and 
undeveloped parts of the country, statutes such as the Clean Air Act,77 
through its Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program,78 lessened the 
cost savings that firms would realize by moving from their old, heavily 
 
 77 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000). 
 78 Id. §§ 7470–7479. 
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developed rust belt locations to the south and southwest. On the margin, 
such laws encouraged firms to remain in older, more developed parts of the 
country. Firms that stayed had an interest, on this model, in cleaning up 
local environments. While it is true that for any given firm the optimal 
outcome was one in which it did not spend on pollution-reduction but every 
other firm in the locality did, no firm could credibly argue that it should be 
exempt from pollution-reduction requirements that applied equally to its 
competitors.79 To solve this problem, federal environmental laws require that 
pollution reduction standards be uniform within a given industry category.80 
Thus for firms whose own profitability was affected by local ambient 
environmental quality, the federal environmental laws ameliorated a natural 
economic response to costly levels of ambient pollution—industrial flight—
and created incentives so that collective regulation was actually in firms’ 
self-interest.  The laws operated differently on the incentives of firms that  
are completely indifferent to ambient environmental conditions. Empirically, 
such complete indifference must be extremely rare. Indeed, the only 
empirically significant example that I can imagine would be firms whose 
sole business is waste disposal. For such firms, there is no level of local 
ambient pollution that is too much. Such firms will not move to escape 
polluted environments. Neither will they perceive any benefit from local or 
national pollution reduction, however it might be accomplished. Such firms 
are precisely the kind that will so degrade ambient environments that they 
are unsuitable for any other use other than as a waste receptacle, a degree of 
degradation that is analogous to the complete collapse of a fishery or other 
renewable resource. 
 
IV. THE RULE OF CAPTURE AND LAND USE 
 
One might suppose that land use is the last place one would expect to 
find the rule of capture. After all, in market economies, the baseline 
ownership/management regime is not unregulated open access acquisition 
of flows by capture, but rather private ownership. A fee simple owner 
should, on the basic economic model, manage his or her land so as to 
maximize its discounted present value. Even if the value of a particular piece 
of land is changing over time (due to exogenous reasons, rather than the 
owner’s land use decisions), a fee simple owner managing the land to 
maximize its present value will fully take account of such anticipated future 
changes. 
This argument is too simplistic. The value of any particular piece of real 
property depends not only upon how it is used, but on how nearby 
 
 79 Indeed, for an entirely domestic industry of identical firms, if all firms have the same 
compliance costs, then although there might be some impact on profitability and total 
employment in the industry, regulatory compliance should have no impact on relative 
employment across firms. 
 80 For example, see the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000), 
and its effluent limitation guidelines, which are uniform, and in which industry categories are 
even geographic. 40 C.F.R. §§ 405.10–471.106 (2004). See also regulations governing Alaska’s 
offshore seafood processing. 40 C.F.R. § 408.100 (2004). 
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properties are used, and on the location of the parcel in two-dimensional 
space. Empirical studies have consistently found that people are willing to 
pay more per square foot for newer houses located closer to open spaces 
(parks, wetlands, lakes), in areas of less dense development, and with better 
views.81 Conversely, traffic congestion and commercial and industrial land 
uses have significant negative effects on house prices and land development 
value.82 Moreover, the externalities from land use decisions are locally 
concentrated. One study found, for example, that proximity to the closest 
small forested area and a forest view had significant positive effects on 
housing prices, but that the total neighborhood forested area and distance to 
the closest large forested area did not significantly affect house prices.83 
Somewhat similarly, other work has found that land prices increase with the 
proportion of agricultural and forested lands within a tenth of a kilometer, 
but decrease as the proportion of such land within a kilometer increases.84 
This finding may be explained, I believe, by another finding—which is that 
scarcity matters, in that only when the total amount of open space in a 
locality is sufficiently small do increases in open space increase residential 
property values.85 On the urban-rural (so-called exurban) fringe, surrounding 
development has a large negative effect on the development value of 
undeveloped land, with the presence of adjacent undeveloped land 
becoming increasingly valuable the farther one moves from the city center.86 
People, moreover, seem quite rational about the long term nature of land 
values, in that permanently preserved open space has been estimated to 
 
 81 See the results and survey of the literature in Jun Jie Wu, Richard M. Adams & Andrew J. 
Plantinga, Amenities in an Urban Equilibrium Model: Residential Development in Portland, 
Oregon, 80 LAND ECON. 19 (2004). For a discussion of some of the older empirical work, see 
Charles J. Fausold & Robert J. Lilieholm, The Economic Value of Open Spaces, 8 LAND LINES 1, 
1–4 (1996) (discussing empirical studies of what they term the “enhancement value” of open 
space), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/publs/pub–detail.asp?id=506. 
 82 See Wu et al., supra note 81, at 29 (discussing the negative effect of traffic congestion on 
housing and land values); Elena G. Irwin & Nancy E. Bockstael, Land Use Externalities, Open 
Space Preservation, and Urban Sprawl, 34 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 705, 720 (2004) (noting 
that parcels with less commerical and industrial land relative to low-density residential land will 
develop at a higher rate). 
 83 Liisa Tyrvainen & Antii Miettinen, Property Prices and Urban Forest Amenities, 39 J. 
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 205, 216–218 (2000). Consistently, Richard Ready and Charles Abdalla 
find that both publicly and privately owned forests and pasture within 400 meters of a house 
have a large positive amenity value, but open space between 400 and 1600 meters from a house 
has a large impact on house value only if it is either publicly owned land, or privately owned 
land subject to a conservation easement. Richard C. Ready & Charles W. Abdalla, The Amenity 
and Disamenity Impacts of Agriculture: Estimates from a Hedonic Pricing Model, 87 AM. J. 
AGRIC. ECON. 314, 320–321 (2005). 
 84 Jacqueline Geoghegan, Lisa A. Wainger & Nancy E. Bockstael, Spatial Landscape Indices 
in a Hedonic Framework: An Ecological Economics Analysis Using GIS, 23 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 
251, 258–259 (1997). 
 85 Paul C. Cheshire & Stephen C. Sheppard, On the Price of Land and the Value of 
Amenities, 62 ECONOMICA 247, 258 (1995). For a recent summary of this work, see Elena G. 
Irwin, The Effects of Open Space on Residential Property Values, 78 LAND ECON. 465, 466 
(2002). 
 86 Elena G. Irwin & Nancy E. Bockstael, Interacting Agents, Spatial Externalities and the 
Evolution of Residential Land Use Patterns, 2 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 31, 47 (2002). 
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have three times the effect on land prices as developable open space.87 As 
summarized by economic geographer Elena Irwin, recent empirical work on 
open space preservation has shown that “[t]he benefits of preserving any 
particular piece of open space are a function of the number of residents 
within the neighboring area, their preferences, and the relative scarcity of 
open space in the region.”88 
 
A. Unregulated Development and Open Space Harvest: The Dynamics of 
Overdevelopment 
 
This large volume of empirical literature shows that, even though land 
is privately owned, so that land development is not itself governed by an 
open-access dynamic, to develop land is to harvest open space (undeveloped 
land), and the quality and quantity of open space has a significant and 
sometimes large external effect on the development value of other nearby 
properties. Private landowners realize benefits and costs from the 
development decisions of their neighbors. In the aggregate, such decisions 
determine the value of a particular place or location. No individual 
landowner, however, has a property right in the value of neighborhood. 
Rather, this value is collectively held by whatever political jurisdiction it is 
that exercises control over local land development decisions. 
Inasmuch as private land development is an attempt to capture the 
value of a particular place at a particular time, unregulated private land 
development is essentially the rule of capture as applied to neighborhood or 
community value. More formally, the per period market value of developing 
a particular property is a function not only of the specific characteristics of 
that piece of property and of general secular trends such as the population 
growth rate, but of the amount of undeveloped land in the nearby area. That 
is, the market value of developing a property with characteristics z at time t, 
v(t), is given by a function such as v(t) = g(t,z) + f(ut), where ut is the amount 
of nearby undeveloped land (open space) remaining at time t.89 The literature 
on land development generally assumes that with a fixed amount  
 
 87 Jacqueline Geohegan, The Value of Open Spaces in Residential Land Use, 19 LAND USE 
POL’Y 91, 96 (2002). Defining neighborhood effects by drawing a 400 meter radial buffer around 
residential property center points, Irwin’s instrumental variables estimation confirms the 
finding (from ordinary least squares regression) that privately owned conserved open space and 
publicly owned (non-military) lands have a positive and significant impact on property value, 
while surrounding forest lands have a negative effect, with negative spillovers from surrounding 
commercial and industrial land use and higher density residential land use being significant and 
relatively large. Irwin, supra note 85, at 474. 
 88 Irwin, supra note 85, at 479. For her exurban D.C. study area, which has relatively rapid 
population growth and open space loss due to land conversion, Irwin puts a lower bound 
estimate on the value of open space preservation of between $1000 and $3300 per acre per 
neighboring household. Id. at 469, 474–475. 
 89 That is, if L is the amount of land in the area, and the amount developed in time period t is 
given by dt, then we have that ut = L − di
i=0
t
∑ . 
2005] THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 891 
 
of undeveloped land available, rising population and income over time 
means that development value increases over time, that is, that ∂g/∂t > 0.90 
   
Figure 6 
Development Value as a Function of Remaining Open Space 
 
As for the impact of the amount of nearby remaining undeveloped land, 
the empirical literature briefly surveyed above suggests the following 
pattern, depicted graphically in Figure 6: 
i) When there is a great deal of undeveloped land remaining, 
development generates positive externalities by making possible the 
provision of various local public goods, including the public good of simply 
having neighbors, so that down to some level ut*, f(ut) > 0. 
ii) Below ut*, development begins to generate negative externalities in 
the form of congestion and loss of amenities provided by local open space, 
so that f(ut) < 0 for ut < ut*. 
The socially optimal time and intensity of development are those that 
maximize the present value of converting the land from open space to 
 
 90 See Anderson & Hill, supra note 4, at 179–180 (relating this model to early U.S. 
homesteading); Lueck, supra note 1, at 396–398 (using this model to describe first possession 
rules’ impact on rent dissipation). See also Dennis R. Capozza & Yuming Li, Optimal Land 
Development Decisions, 51 J. URB. ECON. 123, 126 (2002) (analyzing the optimal timing of 
private land development when developed value is growing geometrically but uncertainly); 
Irwin & Bockstael, supra note 86, at 39 (noting this expectation as it relates to residential land 
use pattern). 
ut ut
* 
f(ut) 
$ 
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developed use, taking into account the impact of development of any 
particular parcel in raising or lowering the present and future value of 
development through the term f(ut). From a private developer’s point of 
view, however, development timing and intensity is determined by 
comparing the value of (optimally intense) present development with the 
value of postponing development and receiving the per period rental value of 
the land in its undeveloped state.91 As the value of development rises with 
income and population, it will eventually exceed the undeveloped value by a 
sufficiently large amount to justify the private cost of development. This will 
be true even if the overall level of development is so high that the 
landowner’s decision to develop generates a negative externality (that is, ut 
is less than ut*). Crucially, while the stock of existing open space at time t 
obviously effects the private decision to develop—because it in part 
determines development value v(t)—a small, competitive private developer 
will have no concern with the effect of her present decision to develop on 
future development values of other neighboring parcels. When the time path 
of open-space preservation takes the form depicted in Figure 6, there is first 
a positive externality from development when cumulative development is at 
a low level, and then a negative externality from development when 
cumulative development is at a high level. Hence at early stages in local 
development, private incentives to develop are generally too weak, so 
development proceeds too slowly, while at later stages, private incentives 
are too strong, so that development goes too far. 
Due to this negative externality, once the private value of development 
exceeds the threshold level that triggers development, private incentives to 
develop will eventually exceed social development incentives, and the stock 
of undeveloped, open space lands left by perfect competition in land 
development will be too low from a social point of view. Just as fishermen 
overharvest under open access, so too is there overdevelopment under open 
access “taking” of the value inherent in existing local open space. 
The overdevelopment incentive remains even if the development 
market is not perfectly competitive, so that developers take account of the 
impact of their present day development decision on the supply of local 
open space and, through this, on the future development decisions of other 
private landowners. Indeed, such interactive, strategic decision making is 
likely to exacerbate the gap between private and social incentives in open 
space harvest. At low levels of cumulative development, development 
confers a positive externality on remaining undeveloped lands, making them 
more valuable, and there is, therefore, an incentive for landowners to wait 
for others to develop first so as to free ride. This causes development to be 
delayed even longer than it would be under perfect competition, where there 
is no such strategic gaming. 
At higher levels of cumulative development, where additional 
development generates a negative externality, strategic developers have the 
opposite incentive, to race to develop before their competitors do, so as to 
 
 91 For formal presentations of this choice calculus, see Capozza & Li, supra note 90, at 126; 
Irwin & Bockstael, supra note 86, at 37. 
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take advantage of the price premium generated by the remaining stock of 
undeveloped land. Indeed, given a time period in which development would 
be privately optimal even without considering the effect of cumulative 
development on development values (that is, development would be 
privately optimal, assuming away the externality from open-space loss), the 
dominant strategy for developers will be to develop, since because 
development generates a negative external effect, they are better off 
developing sooner rather than later regardless of whether other landowners 
develop. That is, development of other parcels can only increase the cost 
from waiting to develop by lowering value, and so if development would be 
privately optimal even considering such costs imposed by others, then it 
must be privately optimal when those costs are considered. By this same 
argument, the prospect that development value will be lower in the future 
because of the development and loss of existing open space may actually 
move forward the optimal date of private development.92 Anticipating 
development by others, developers rush to develop, generating negative 
externalities that make all developers worse off.93 
 
B. Why Overdevelopment Does Not Mean the “Extinction” of Open Space: 
the Self-Correcting Properties of Land Market Equilibria 
 
Just as the externality in an open access fishery does not mean that 
open access harvest will necessarily lead to the extinction of the fish stock, 
so too the open space externality that besets land development does not 
imply that decentralized, competitive development markets will eliminate all 
open space in a locality. If the development externality function f(ut) takes 
the form depicted by Figure 6, then the externality will eventually be large 
enough so that the value of development is less than its opportunity cost 
(the cost of development plus the lost rents from keeping the property in 
agricultural use). Just as increasing effort devoted to a fishery eventually 
decreases the stock, decreasing productivity and eventually profitability, 
leading to exit from the industry, so too will the various external costs of 
development eventually mean lower local amenities, lower property values, 
and less effort devoted to development. 
 
 92 I ignore competitive effects that arise because by developing first a developer may face 
less competition and have temporary market power, and these tend to further encourage early 
development. For a consideration of how such competitive effects may interact with the length 
of the building delay to generate development cascades—simultaneous development—during 
periods of depressed demand, see Steven R. Grenadier, The Strategic Exercise of Options: 
Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets, 51 J. FIN. 1653 (1996). 
 93 It is true that if potential buyers were fully aware of all present day development 
decisions on their effect on the future value of their homes, then they would discount the 
present price by an amount equal to the decline caused by present day loss of open space. While 
it seems plausible that developers might be aware of present day development incentives, it 
seems a stretch to assume that buyers are so familiar with the structure of the development 
game, and actual decisions of developers, that they take account of the future cost of the loss of 
open space caused by present day development. More importantly, even with hyper-
sophisticated buyers, given a positive interest rate, a developer is better off obtaining the 
discounted price paid by such buyers today rather than refraining from development and getting 
the same price later. 
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This model predicts precisely what one observes in the current debate 
over open space preservation. People who are concerned with the loss of 
open space are not, it seems, so concerned that there will be no open space 
left; instead they are concerned that market development incentives are 
generating a highly fragmented pattern of development that is irrational in 
that it generates an unnecessary negative externality. “Fragmentation” 
means the tendency for market incentives to lead to low density, diffuse 
residential development—often called “sprawl”—as opposed to clustered, 
town-like development.94 Sprawl opponents argue that clustered 
development leaves larger blocks of open space, and that such larger blocks 
are socially desirable because they cut down on congestion and other 
negative externalities that accompany fragmented development, while 
providing higher levels of local public goods such as runoff control, and 
plant and animal habitat. 
 
Figure 7 
Impact of Open Space Preservation on Development 
 
Such a complaint is predicted by my analysis, which says that precisely 
because open space is a valuable but highly localized amenity, developers 
will try to capitalize on that value. However, in the process they will 
generate both a fragmented overall pattern, and losses for other landowners. 
Figure 7 depicts this spatial outcome. In that figure, there are two protected 
open space areas, B1 and B3. To capture open space value, landowners 
develop the shaded strip of land closest to these protected areas. This 
pattern of development generates negative externalities for landowners 
 
 94 For a general discussion of fragmentation and some maps depicting fragmented 
development in central Maryland, see Irwin and Bockstael, supra note 86 at, 34–36. 
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whose lands lie outside the developed area in that the development has 
generated increased congestion, while depriving other landowners of direct 
access to the open space. The pattern in Figure 7 is obviously more 
fragmented than a number of alternatives, such as concentrating higher 
density development in block B2. Of course, such concentrated development 
clearly involves a loss to owners of the lands adjacent to the protected open 
space areas. For such mandatory clustering to be socially beneficial, the 
collective local benefits from keeping more total undeveloped land must 
more than offset the loss to landowners who are not allowed to capitalize on 
open space values. 
 
C. The Regulatory Paradox Redux 
 
As the previous example perhaps indicates, given the complex temporal 
and spatial dynamics of land development, regulating land development to 
preserve undeveloped land is a very complex and difficult task. Regulations 
designed to preserve open space will shift not only development patterns but 
also land and house prices. If anticipated, such regulations may actually 
worsen the very race to develop that they are designed to control. Just as 
with pollution, as the value of open space increases, the less of it remains. 
Thus the value of open space may not be realized until it has already been 
lost. Yet by the very same token, a completely undeveloped locality cannot 
know precisely what level and pattern of open space preservation will 
maximize long term locational values. 
More precisely, as with the regulation of natural resource harvest and 
pollution, a very basic problem with land development regulation is that 
while the social goal is to regulate so as to create private incentives to 
choose the optimal development path over time, regulations are likely, at 
best, to aim for static efficiency. To see this, consider the following example, 
which captures in numerical form many of the same points displayed by the 
earlier graphical analysis. Suppose that we have reached a time period such 
that, abstracting from the open-space externality, each parcel is worth 100 if 
developed and 70 if kept undeveloped, say in agricultural use. Suppose 
further, however, that as captured by Figure 6, we are in a region where 
development generates a negative externality because of the loss of 
community open space, and that this negative externality increases, with an 
increased overall level of development. Further, suppose that the marginal 
negative externality from one additional parcel of development, shared 
equally among the four parcels, is 10, then 16, 32 and finally 60, as we go 
from the first to the last parcel being developed. 
Without regulation, each landowner’s optimal strategy is to develop 
immediately. This follows directly from the fact that even if all other 
landowners are developing, so that the negative externality is maximized, it 
is still best to develop (if all four develop, the total per parcel externality is 
29.5, and so net development value still exceeds undeveloped, agricultural 
value). From the point of maximizing the net societal benefit from 
development, however, there should only be two parcels developed, as 
development beyond two parcels generates external harm—either 32 or 60—
896 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 35:855 
that exceeds the net gain of 30 on each parcel. Hence from the point of view 
of the basic economic criterion of maximizing total net benefits, 
uncontrolled development leads to too much development. 
Now consider a development ban that is ex post efficient in that it will 
be imposed, if and only if, a proposed development is inefficient, in the 
sense that its social costs exceed its social benefits. As clarified by the 
present numerical example, while it sounds good, such a ban will actually 
never be imposed. As just shown, the unique (Nash) equilibrium95 in the 
development game is for all four landowners to develop immediately. 
Moreover, simultaneous development by all four is efficient, at least in the 
sense that its benefits exceed its costs. Therefore, simultaneous 
development is allowed under the rule that imposes a ban only on inefficient 
development. 
The problem is that like the other ex post efficient policies considered 
for resource harvest and pollution, this hypothetical development ban is 
based upon the static efficiency of actual observed choices, in this case land 
development, rather than dynamic efficiency—efficiency relative to other 
feasible intertemporal development paths. In order to get the socially best 
development path—which is immediate development of two parcels, and a 
ban on any further development—a choice must be made as to which two 
parcels can be developed. In the aggregate, such a development limitation 
generates a net gain of 32, which is far better than the aggregate net of only 2 
that results under the ineffective, static efficiency-based ban. However, 
unless large transfer payments are made to the two developers who are 
forbidden from developing, the development limitation will make those two 
developers worse off than under unregulated private development. Hence 
even though it leads to a far superior result from a social point of view, the 
dynamically efficient policy—the two parcel development limitation—will 
face political opposition, whereas the static efficiency-based development 
ban will be unopposed because it is ineffective. 
In practice, such development bans are likely to have even worse 
incentive effects by actually encouraging early development. Land use 
regulations that are an ex post reaction to disappearing open space, such as 
zoning limitations and development moratoria, amount to a first come–last 
regulated system. They reward early developers by offering them less 
regulation, thereby penalizing those who wait to develop. If, as argued 
earlier, there are positive externalities from development at early stages of 
development, then the first come–last regulated system may actually make 
sense as intended to offset the incentive for developers to wait too long, in 
an attempt to free ride off the early developers. At such early stages of 
development, however, the regulatory system is likely one of relatively 
uncontrolled development. Rather, as a matter of stylized historical fact, it 
seems clear that first come–last regulated systems arise only after people 
become concerned about overdevelopment. At such a stage in the 
 
 95 A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies having the property that each player’s (in our 
instance, landowner’s) strategy maximizes her payoff, given the strategies pursued by the other 
players. For this definition and further explication of the Nash Equilibrium concept, see, e.g., 
DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 28–36 (1990). 
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development process, development likely does generate negative 
externalities, so the last thing one would want is a regulatory system that 
offers additional incentives to develop before the development door closes. 
Yet this is precisely what first come–last regulated systems do. 
There are, of course, alternatives to first come–last regulated open 
space preservation systems. Over the past decade in the United States, a 
very popular alternative has been for states and localities to buy and 
preserve open space. Of the 454 open space initiatives placed on state and 
local ballots between 1998 and 2000, voters approved eighty-four percent, 
authorizing the expenditure of 17.1 billion dollars on open space 
acquisition.96 Yet the impact of such public open space acquisition programs 
on the actual amount of open space in an area is ambiguous. The reason is 
that open space preservation has strong indirect effects that actually 
stimulate development. One of these effects is to stimulate demand for 
parcels located near open space. If this is so, then as the authors of one 
recent study state, open space preservation in the sprawling rural-urban 
fringe could actually attract new residents to such areas, with the end result 
that “preservation programs that enhance the value of rural amenities could 
act as a magnet for future growth in areas where preservation occurs.”97 
Similarly, open space preservation changes the spatial distribution of 
various local environmental amenities and therefore affects private land 
development decisions.98 When a small area of open space is acquired, the 
development value of nearby properties increases, thus increasing the rate 
of development.99 Thus, unless large amounts of contiguous open space are 
acquired (as in the urban growth ring or growth boundary strategies now 
pursued by some municipalities), increasing the amount of publicly owned 
and preserved land can actually decrease the total amount of open space in a 
metropolitan area.100 When open space values spill over across local 
metropolitan areas, matters get even more complex, as open space 
preservation in one municipality may confer such large benefits on an 
adjacent municipality that the latter acquires less open space than if 
preservation had not been pursued next door.101 
 
V. CONCLUSION: THE NOT SO PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF THE RULE OF CAPTURE 
 
I hope to have persuaded the reader that an admittedly stylized, 
mathematical model that has become the standard tool for analyzing the 
dynamics of natural resource harvest under open access and other 
 
 96 Wu et al., supra note 81, at 19. 
 97 Brian Roe, Elena G. Irwin & Hazel A. Morrow–Jones, The Effects of Farmland, Farmland 
Preservation, and Other Neighborhood Amenities on Housing Values and Residential Growth, 
80 LAND ECON. 55, 56 (2004). 
 98 Wu et al., supra note 81, at 20. 
 99 Irwin & Bockstael, supra note 82, at 720–722. 
 100 This is an important result of the general equilibrium analysis presented by Randall P. 
Walsh, Endogenous Open Space Amenities in a Locational Equilibrium, http:// 
www.colorado.edu/ Economics/CEA/WPs-04/wp04-03/wp04-03.pdf. (last visited , Nov. 9, 2005). 
 101 Elizabeth Marshall, Open-Space Amenities, Interacting Agents, and Equilibrium 
Landscape Structure, 80 LAND ECON. 272 (2004). 
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management regimes also generates substantial insight into the dynamics of 
pollution and land development problems. The consensus view is that while 
the open access, rule of capture management regime may have been socially 
desirable when there was very little pressure on natural resources,102 its time 
has long since passed, as it has led to overharvest, overpollution, and 
overdevelopment that threatens the world with the irreversible loss of 
natural resources. On this view, what we need now is a regulatory system 
that both caps overall use levels and allocates uses to particular areas and to 
particular users in the form of tradable use rights. 
The analysis presented here cautions against too much optimism 
regarding such a regulatory solution. On my view, many problems that are 
conventionally attributed to open access are, in fact, due to government 
policies that have systematically subsidized overuse and market entry far 
beyond levels that would have occurred under a pure open access system. 
The rule of capture persisted in part, I believe, because of its own self-
limiting dynamics. Even if democratic, political processes have no such self-
limiting economic dynamic. It remains to be seen whether governments that 
have systematically intervened to weaken the inherent self-limiting 
properties of open access resource use will succeed in coming up with 
better regulatory alternatives. 
 
 102 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 717 (1986) (discussing the “plenteous goods” idea, in which 
goods are so plentiful that a resource management system seems unnecessary); Harold 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMER. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (discussing an 
economic theory of property rights). What “little pressure” seems to mean, more precisely, is 
conditions under which rents are not fully dissipated—there is not entry until average product 
equals average cost—because there are entry restrictions of some sort, or because there are 
many resources relative to the number of potential users. As Lueck states, when there are few 
users, “open access may persist optimally because few people are exploiting the resource or 
because marginal use costs are high . . . .” Lueck, supra note 1, at 405. 
